Biosafety Regulation: a comparative analysis of the South African and Ugandan experience by Joy, Faida
1 
STUDENT NAME: FAIDA JOY 
STUDENT NUMBER: FDXJOY001 
DEGREE: LLM (MARINE AND ENVIRONMENTAL  
LAW)  
DISSERTATION TITLE: BIOSAFETY REGULATION: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND UGANDAN EXPERIENCE 




Research dissertation presented for the final approval of Senate in fulfillment of part of 
the requirement for the degree of Master of Laws in approved courses and a minor 
dissertation. The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the completion of 
a programme of courses.  
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the  
submission of  Master of Laws dissertation, including relating to length and plagiarism, 








Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................... iii 
CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................................... 5 
KEY CONCEPTS............................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Biosafety, Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms. ............................ 5 
2.2 The Need for Biosafety Regulation .......................................................................... 8 
2.3 Adequate Biosafety Regulation ................................................................................ 9 
CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................................... 11 
BIOSAFETY REGULATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
INSTRUMENT................................................................................................................. 11 
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 11 
3.2 Convention on Biological Diversity ...................................................................... 11 
3.3 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ..................................................................... 12 
3.3.1 Background ...................................................................................................... 12 
3.3.2 Objective .......................................................................................................... 13 
3.3.3 Scope................................................................................................................ 14 
3.3.4 Advanced Informed Agreement ...................................................................... 15 
3.4.5 Risk Assessment .............................................................................................. 17 
3.3.6 Risk Management ............................................................................................ 18 
3.3.7 The Precautionary Principle............................................................................. 19 
3.3.8 Socio-economic Considerations....................................................................... 20 
3.3.9 Public Awareness and Participation................................................................. 21 
3.3.10 Handling, Identification and Packaging......................................................... 22 
3.3.11 Liability, Redress and Compensation ............................................................ 23 
3.3.12 Confidential information................................................................................ 24 
3.4 The African Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology:............................................ 25 
3.4.1 Scope................................................................................................................ 26 
3.4.2 Advanced Informed Agreement....................................................................... 26 
3.4.3 Precautionary Principle.................................................................................... 27 
3.4.4 Public Participation.......................................................................................... 27 
3.4.5 Labelling and Identification............................................................................. 28 
3.4.6 Liability and Redress ....................................................................................... 28 
3.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 29 
CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................................................................... 31 
OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BIOSAFETY REGIME ...................................... 31 
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 31 
4.2 Principal Legislation ............................................................................................... 31 
4.2.1 The Genetically Modified Organisms Act ....................................................... 31 
4.2.2 The GMO Regulations..................................................................................... 33 
4.2.3 The Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Bill .................................. 33 
4.3 The Policy documents............................................................................................. 35 
4.3.1 Biosafety Policy............................................................................................... 35 
4.3.2 Guideline Document for use by the Advisory Committee when considering 




4.3.3 Guideline Documents for Work with Genetically Modified Organisms ......... 36 
4.4 Other Relevant Legislation ..................................................................................... 36 
4.4.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act .................................... 36 
4.4.2 Promotion of Access to Information Act ......................................................... 38 
4.4.3 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act......................................................... 38 
4.4.4 The National Environmental Management Act ............................................... 39 
4.4.5 The Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act........................................... 42 
4.4.6 The National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act .......................... 42 
CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................................... 44 
CRITIQUE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BIOSAFETY REGIME......................................... 44 
5.1 Objectives and Scope of the GMO Act................................................................... 44 
5.2 Institutional Arrangements...................................................................................... 44 
5.3 Risk Assessment ..................................................................................................... 46 
5.4 Liability Regime ..................................................................................................... 48 
5.5 Decision-making ..................................................................................................... 49 
5.6 Public Participation................................................................................................. 50 
5.7 Labelling Requirements .......................................................................................... 51 
5.8 Confidentiality and Access to Information ............................................................. 53 
5.9 Administrative Justice Provisions........................................................................... 54 
5.10 Appeals ................................................................................................................. 55 
5.11 Fast Track Mechanism.......................................................................................... 56 
5.12 Enforcement and Compliance mechanisms .......................................................... 56 
5.13 Unintentional Release and Emergency Measures................................................. 57 
5.14 Prohibition of Activities........................................................................................ 58 
5.15 Inconsistency with Other Laws............................................................................. 58 
5.16 Conclusion: ........................................................................................................... 59 
CHAPTER 6 ..................................................................................................................... 60 
OVERVIEW OF UGANDA’S BIOSAFETY REGIME.................................................. 60 
6.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 60 
6.2 Principal Legislation ............................................................................................... 60 
6.2.1 Draft National Biosafety Regulations.............................................................. 60 
6.2.2 Uganda Biosafety Bill...................................................................................... 62 
6.3 Relevant Policy ....................................................................................................... 63 
6.3.1 The National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy.......................................... 63 
6.3.2 The Guidelines for Biosafety in Biotechnology for Uganda ........................... 64 
CHAPTER 7 ..................................................................................................................... 65 
CRITIQUE OF UGANDA’S BIOSAFETY REGIME .................................................... 65 
7.1 Scope and Exclusions ............................................................................................. 65 
7.2 Institutional Arrangements...................................................................................... 66 
7.3 Application and Approval Procedures .................................................................... 67 
7.4 Decision-making Procedure.................................................................................... 68 
7.5 Review of Decisions ............................................................................................... 69 
7.6 Public Awareness and Participation........................................................................ 69 
7.7 Risk Assessment and Risk Management ................................................................ 71 
7.8 Confidentiality and Access to information ............................................................. 73 




7.10 Unintentional Release and Emergency Measures................................................. 75 
7.11 Liability Regime ................................................................................................... 75 
7.12 Labelling and Identification.................................................................................. 76 
7.13 Offences and Penalties.......................................................................................... 76 
7.14 Compliance and Enforcement............................................................................... 77 
7.15 Legal Authority..................................................................................................... 78 
7.16 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 78 
CHAPTER 8 ..................................................................................................................... 80 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND UGANDA’S BIOSAFETY 
REGIMES......................................................................................................................... 80 
8.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 80 
8.2 Institutional Arrangement ....................................................................................... 80 
8.3 Decision-making ..................................................................................................... 82 
8.4 Public participation ................................................................................................. 83 
8.5 Risk Assessment ..................................................................................................... 83 
8.6 Liability and redress................................................................................................ 84 
8.7 Labelling and Identification.................................................................................... 85 
8.8 Compliance and Enforcement................................................................................. 85 
8.9 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 86 







I wish to acknowledge the assistance of all those who contributed in one way or the other 
towards the achievement of this work. To the Almighty God, You are my Rock, to you be 
all the Glory. Mum and Dad, may the good Lord richly bless you for the tireless efforts 
towards giving me the best, I could not ask for more. Tricia, Franco and Pam, I appreciate 
you people a lot! Auntie Irene, you are the best God-mum in the whole wide world. I 
thank God for that big heart. To all my friends both new and old, thank you for being you, 
encouraging and supportive friends. Last but important, my supervisor Sandy Paterson. 

























This study provides a critical and comparative analysis of biosafety regulation in South 
Africa and Uganda.  The overall objective of the study is to establish which country 
prescribes a more adequate regulatory regime.  Biosafety regulation under international 
and regional law is the first key aspect that this paper examines.  This is done in order to 
set out a context under which domestic biosafety regulation is examined.  This study 
argues that international law generally sets minimum standards while regional law sets 
higher standards for biosafety regulation.  The second key area examined is biosafety 
regulation in South Africa.  The paper sets out an overview of the relevant biosafety laws 
in South Africa and conducts a critical analysis of these laws pointing out their strengths 
and weaknesses.  The study is premised on the argument that South African regulatory 
regime is inadequate for purposes of regulating biosafety.  
 
The third part of this paper focuses on Uganda’s regulatory regime. A similar analysis 
was carried where the study found that the Ugandan regime is reasonably adequate for 
purposes of protection of the environment and human health. The final key aspect of this 
paper is a comparative analysis of biosafety regulation in South Africa and Uganda. This 
is done thematically, setting out differences and similarities. This part examines the 
extent to which South Africa and Uganda have attempted to comply with their 
international obligations. This paper concludes that, although the Ugandan regulatory 
regime (both existing and proposed) has some weaknesses, it is a more adequate regime 
than the South African one. Further, Uganda is more compliant with the biosafety 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
A key role that governments have to play is to protect the environment and its people 
from the potential harm associated with GMOs.  Yet, Africa is experiencing mounting 
controversy concerning the role and regulation of modern biotechnology in the 
continent’s economic transformation and sustainable development.
1
 According to a 
‘living paper’ prepared for the African Policy Dialogues on Biotechnology, there are four 
main issues which are subject to intense disagreement and which require to be resolved 
on the African continent in relation to the regulation of modern biotechnology.
2
These are 
the precautionary principle, socio-economic considerations, liability and redress, and 
public awareness. In addition, issues of labeling and traceability constitute part of the 
global controversy relating to genetically modified organisms.
3
 The foregoing are among 
the critical issues which need to be considered when evaluating biosafety regulation. 
 
The need to regulate genetically modified organisms (GMOs) arose as a response to the 
development of the recombinant DNA technology in the 1970s.
4
  The global community 
has not entirely embraced this new form of biotechnology.  While the use of this 
technology in pharmaceuticals and vaccines has been widely accepted, the contrary 
applies in respect to genetically modified (GM) crops and GM foods.
5
  This attitude 





                                                 
1
Governing Biotechnology in Africa: ‘Towards Consensus on key Issues in Biosafety’, 20-24
th
 September 




 David M and Gavin G, ‘Genetically Modified Food Labeling and the WTO Agreements’ (2004) 13 (3) 
RECEIL 306 at 306(specifically referring to the EU and US). 
4
 Governing Biotechnology in Africa, supra note 1. 
5
 David et al, supra note 3, at 306-307. 
6




South Africa not only grows GMOs commercially on a large scale, it also imports GM 
crops.
7
 The common GM crops are GM cotton, soya and maize. South Africa imports 
GM maize from Argentina and the United States.
8
  Significantly, the country has taken 
steps to regulate biosafety, through the enactment of the Genetically Modified Organisms 
Act, (15 of 1997). It is the first country in Africa to enact a specific legislation regulating 
GMOs  
 
South Africa is arguably the most ‘advanced’ country in Africa in the area of GMOs. It 
appears to be the trendsetter in this area. However, the precedent South Africa has set 
faces criticism from skeptics by reason of the inherent weaknesses of its regulatory 
regime. The regulatory regime lacks in material respects including those pertaining to the 
precautionary principle, risk assessment and public participation. 
 
Uganda is one of the African states that is trying to put in place specific legislation for 
biosafety. Although it has not yet enacted an Act for biosafety, quite remarkably Uganda 
has made substantial efforts towards achieving that goal.  Currently a Biosafety Bill 2005 
has been drafted. Whether the said Bill sees the light of the day remains to be seen. There 
are Draft Regulations on Biosafety and other relevant publications including guidelines 
and policies. The position of the Ugandan Government on GM foods, according to top 
officials from the National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO), is that ‘GM 
foods can be considered safe for human consumption until proved otherwise’
9
 thereby 
adopting the American approach.  Interestingly this position is contrary to the 
precautionary principle.
10
  This principle provides that where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
11
 As a result, 
application of the precautionary principle requires that GM foods be presumed unsafe 
until proved otherwise. 
                                                 
7





 http://www.africabiotech.com/news2/article.php?uid=115.  
10
 The precautionary principle is discussed in detail in part 3.2.7 of this paper.  
11




Uganda imports GM foods for consumption but not for cultivation.
12
  The government 
has the support of both scientists and farmers who await the enactment of the Bill into 
law in preparation for new GM projects.
13
 The enactment of the Bill into law is expected 
to open doors for new GM crops including Bt cotton and disease tolerant bananas.
14
  The 
banana crop is currently being improved in what is known to be ‘one of the most 
advanced biotech research laboratories in Africa’ opened by the Uganda government in 
2003.
15
  Furthermore, Uganda is expected to be the next country after South Africa to 
introduce Bt cotton, which will allegedly reduce the use of pesticides and increase 
productivity.
16
   
 
Objective of the study 
Having noted that South Africa and Uganda have taken different approaches towards the 
regulation of GMOs, this study examines which of the two regimes provides a 
satisfactory regime that may be acceptable to other countries in Africa.  As a result, this 
dissertation constitutes a critical and comparative analysis of the contrasting biosafety 
regimes of South Africa and Uganda.  
 
Outline of the study 
The analysis commences with a consideration of key international and regional 
instruments such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety and the African Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology.
17
  These instruments 
should set the context for the domestic regulation of biosafety in both South Africa and 
Uganda. 
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 Convention on Biological Diversity 31 ILM, 818 (1992),  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 39 ILM 1027 






The second part of the analysis focuses on South Africa. It provides a brief overview of 
laws of relevance to biosafety regulation and a detailed critical analysis of the extent to 
which these laws provide an effective and equitable regulatory approach. An identical 
enquiry is undertaken for Uganda in the third part of this dissertation. 
 
The dissertation concludes with a comparative analysis of the two counties biosafety 
regimes. It highlights their similarities and differences; comparative strengths and 
weaknesses; and aspects requiring urgent reform in order to bring them in compliance 
with international and regional instruments.  This comparison is undertaken under certain 
key themes, namely: institutional arrangements, decision-making process; risk 
assessments; public participation; labeling and identification; liability and redress; 







2.1 Biosafety, Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms. 
 
Biosafety is a rather broad term related to different fields including agriculture, medicine 
and ecology. This paper focuses on biosafety in the context of agriculture. The Cartagena 
Protocol, the most important international instrument on biosafety surprisingly does not 
define the term. However, it may generally be perceived as efforts aimed at reducing and 
eliminating potential risks resulting from biotechnology and its products.
18
 The National 
Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy of Uganda defines biosafety as; ‘…a collective term 
that refers to the safe development, transfer and application of biotechnology and its 
products.’
19
 It includes measures used for assessment and management of risks linked to 
GMOs, mechanisms established to regulate and control  potential risks that biotechnology 
poses to human health, the environment and socio-economic impacts.
20
 As noted above, 
there is a close link between biosafety and biotechnology; hence, an understanding of 
biotechnology is imperative. 
 
Biotechnology refers to ‘the application of science and engineering in the direct or 
indirect use of living organisms or parts or products of living organism in their natural or 
modified forms.’
21
 The term has also been defined to mean ‘…any technological 
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make 
or modify products or processes for a specific use.’
22
 To put it simply, biotechnology 
provides for the transfer of genetic material between species.
23
  




 National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy, Uganda National Council for Science and Technology, 




 Wallis E, ‘Fish Genes Into Tomatoes: How the World Regulates Genetically Modified Organisms’ 2004  
80 North Dakota Law Review at 422  (quoting Reimer P and Schwartz B , Trade and Genetically Modified 
Foods: Biotechnology : A Canadian Perspective, 1 ASPER REV. INT’L  BUS & TRADE L. 91, 91 (2000).  
22
 Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, Frequently Asked Questions on the Biosafety Protocol, available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/faqs.asp?area=biotechnology&faq=1  See also Art 2 Convention on 
Biological Diversity 31 ILM, 818 (1992).  
23
 McGinn K A, Symposium Articles and Note (1999-2000) 12 Georgetown. International Environmental 




The biotechnology industry is acclaimed for benefits such as advancement in medicine 
and agriculture. Potential benefits of using this type of technology in agriculture include 
higher yields on less acreage of land, disease and pest resistant varieties and selectivity in 
acquiring preferred traits.
24
 On the other hand, skeptics argue that the application of 
biotechnology in agriculture is potentially risky.  It is feared that the modified genes or 
the transgenes may migrate into non-target organisms, leading to the creation of herbicide 
resistant weeds or causing adulteration of foods.
25
 Farmers using genetically modified 
seeds are required to sign agreements, which forbid them from saving seed. As such, the 
practice of saving seed and developing seed banks is being threatened.
26
 Given that a 
huge number of farmers rely on their seed banks especially for their food needs, any 




Genetically modified crops encourage the practice of mono cropping.
28
 This practice is a 
threat to the diversity of traditional agricultural methods that have been applied over 
time.
29
 Further, the practice makes crops more susceptible to crop failure in case the 
crops come under attack.
30
 A greater diversity of crops is more likely to withstand an 
attack than uniform crops.
31
 The users of GM crops are also required to pay royalties to 
the patent holder and yet it is very clear that many poor farmers cannot afford to pay 
this.
32
 Surprisingly, the duty to pay royalties appears to extend to persons whose crops 
have been contaminated by a patented genetically modified gene.
33
 In the Percy 
Schmeiser case involving a Canadian farmer, a Canadian court ordered Percy Schmeiser 
to pay royalties to the patent holder, Monsanto, notwithstanding the fact that his canola 
crop had been contaminated by that of a third party.
34
 
                                                 
24
 Saigo H, ‘Agricultural Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol’ (1999-2000) 12 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 779 at 784. 
25
Ibid at 787. 
26
 Barron N, ‘A Case of Throwing Caution to the Wind; A Critical Analysis of the EIA Provisions 




















Further, it is has been argued that the use of GM crops facilitates dependency of 
developing countries on the foreign Multi-national companies that supply the seeds such 
as Monsanto.
35
 Biotechnology has over the years brought about enormous changes in 
agricultural practices
36
 through genetic engineering of crops. Therefore, it poses a great 




Genetic engineering is one form of technological advancement in agriculture that is quite 
ground-breaking.
38
 Genetic modification is only one of the techniques of modern 
biotechnology and it is the most highly contested.
39
  Here, contrary to the conventional 
methods of plant and animal breeding, there is direct manipulation of genetic material in 




GMOs are products of genetic transfer, better yet products of biotechnology.
41
 The 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
42
 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
43
 
both make use of the term ‘living modified organisms’ (LMOs).
44
 LMOs include GMOs 
therefore; the two terms may be used interchangeably.
45
 The term LMOs was introduced 
into the CBD language by grain producing countries that sought to evade regulation for 




GMOs are very controversial arguably because of the potential risks associated with their 
use. Additionally there is uncertainty surrounding the extent of the potential risks. There 
                                                 
35
 Ibid at 102. 
36
 Teel J, ‘Regulating Genetically Modified Products and Processes: An Overview of the Approaches’ 




 Falkner R and Gupta A, Implementing the Biosafety Protocol: Key Challenges, Chatham House Briefing 
Paper No. 4 (London: RIIA, 2004)  
39
 An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety at 7. Available at 
http://www.ecoconsult.ch/uploads/1144-Biosafety-guide.pdf 
40
 Ibid.  
41
 Teel, supra note 36.  
42
  39 ILM 1027 (2002).  
43
 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
44
 LMO is defined in Article 3 of the Biosafety Protocol as any living organism that possesses a novel 
combination of genetic materials contained using modern Biotechnology.  
45
 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2
nd
 Ed, 2002 at 580. For purposes of clarity, 
the term GMOs will be used throughout this paper.  
46




are economic, environmental and consumer health risks and related benefits associated to 
the use of GMOs.
47
 The economic benefits include increased yields, reduced net input 
costs and increased profits.
48
 On the other hand, economic risks associated to their use 
may include failure of technology to produce anticipated benefits and loss of exports due 
to increased consumer resistance to GM foods.
49
 Regarding the environment, it has been 
argued that, GM technologies lessen biodiversity loss and damage as they reduce clearing 
for agriculture. A serious environmental threat, however, is that modified genes could be 
transferred to non-GM genes, creating varieties that may threaten biodiversity. With 
regard to health, proponents promise increased yields that could be used to feed 





2.2 The Need for Biosafety Regulation 
The purpose of biosafety is to serve as a device for ensuring the safe use of biotechnology 
products without posing undue risk to human health, the environment, or unnecessary 
constraints on transfer of technology.
51
 Biosafety regulation is a mechanism for the safe 
use of biotechnology applications into the environment.
52
 According to one commentator, 
biosafety regulation is instrumental for ensuring the environmental and human safety of 
GMOs as well as giving people the confidence in GMO products.
53
 Another commentator 
observes that regulation in biotechnology, or biosafety regulation for that matter, serves 
three main functions; ‘risk management, facilitating commercial transactions and 
generating public trust in new technologies’.
54
 Elsewhere, the functions ascribed to 
biosafety are said to be three-dimensional: providing choice, ensuring safety and meeting 
                                                 
47
 Meijer E and Stewart R, ‘The GM Cold War: How Developing Countries Can Go from Being Dominos 












 Jaffe G (2006) A Comparative Analysis of the National Biosafety Regulatory Systems in East Africa. 
EPT Discussion Paper 146 Available at http://www.ifpri.org/divs/eptd/dp/papers/eptdp146.pdf. Jaffe G, 
Biosafety Regulation in the North and South. Available at 
http://www.cspinet.net/biotech/biosafety_regulation_ns.pdf. 
54





a country’s international obligation.
55
 The one function that runs through all purposes set 
out by the different sources is safety. One may conclude therefore, that the key purpose 
of bio-safety is to ensure safety.  
 
2.3 Adequate Biosafety Regulation 
It is not an easy task to describe what amounts to adequate regulation in biosafety. This is 
particularly the case in the light of the different functions that biosafety regulation serves. 
Biosafety regulation that is adequate in the context of risk management may not 
necessarily be adequate for purposes of facilitating commercial transactions. Due to 
differences in traditions and circumstances in the different regions of the world, there 
appears to be a wide variance in the attitudes towards risks associated with GMOs and 
their regulation.
56
 For purposes of this paper, an adequate biosafety regulation is 




A ‘protective’ biosafety regulatory system is one that safeguards human health and the 
environment from the risks posed by genetically modified organisms.
58
 Such a system 
must be functional, meaning that it has to be workable, understandable, equitable, fair, 
adaptive and enforceable.
59
 Additional characteristics of a functional and protective 
regulatory system include the need for it to be comprehensive, transparent, participatory, 
flexible and efficient.
60
 It must have adequate legal authority and it must set clear safety 
standards, prescribe a proportionate risk based review as well as provide for post 
approval oversight.
61
 It is also worth noting that the existence of biosafety regulation will 
most often depend on the type of government in a country and its politics, its perception 
                                                 
55
 Newell P and Mackenzie R, ‘The 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Legal and Political Dimensions’ 
(2002) 10 Global Environmental Change   available at http://www.gapresearch.org/governance/GEC8.pdf 
56
 Nelkin D et al, ‘The International Challenge of Genetically Modified Organisms Regulation’ (1999-2000) 
8 New York University Environmental Law Journal 523 at 524. 
57




 UNEP – GEF BIOSAFETY UNIT 2004 in Jaffe (2006), supra note 52 at 2. 
60











The subsequent section considers biosafety regulation under international instruments. A 
number of World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements have implications on domestic 
regulation of biosafety.
63
 Countries have to take the terms of these into consideration 
when enacting their domestic legislation. However, the discussion will not cover the trade 
related aspects of Biosafety regulation. Similarly, the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC) and the Codex Alimentaruis have implications on biosafety regulation 




                                                 
62
 Ibid at 2. 
63
 Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement GATT Doc. MTN/FA li-A1A-4, 33 ILM XXX; Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) 18 ILM 1079 (1979); General Agreements in Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) 33 
ILM 28 (1994) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 33 
ILM 1197 (1994).   
64
 International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) available at http://www.ipcc.int/IPP/En/defaults.htm 





BIOSAFETY REGULATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The roots of international biosafety regulation may be traced back to the period between 
1970 and 1980 during which problems associated with biotechnology were identified.
65
 
This process later culminated into the introduction of a number of international and 
regional instruments of direct or indirect relevance to biosafety regulation. These include 
the CBD,
66
 the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
67
 and the African Model Law on Safety 
in Biotechnology.
68
 These instruments set out rights and obligations to regulate 
biosafety/biotechnology. Furthermore, they provide for the right and obligation of states 
to take considerations such as food safety, health, environmental concerns and food 




A discussion on the above cited international instruments is important, as the both 
Uganda and South Africa are parties to these. Consequently the instruments should have 
been guided them in developing their domestic legislation. The domestic regimes of the 
two countries will be assessed against the standards set by the instruments in order to 
determine the extent of their compliance with such standards.  
 
3.2 Convention on Biological Diversity 
The Convention on biological diversity (CBD) is the parent treaty to the Cartagena 
Biosafety Protocol. The CBD was adopted in May 1992 in Nairobi.
70
  On 5 May 1992, it 
was opened for signature at the Rio Summit and entered into force on 29 December 
1992.
71
 The central focus of the CBD is the conservation of biodiversity and equitable 
                                                 
65
Biosafety Guide, supra note 39 at 2. 
66
 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
67




 Mackenzie R, ‘International Regulation of Modern Biotechnology’ at 3 available at 
http://www.gapresearch.org/governance/RMregulationfinal.pdf. 
70






distribution of its benefits.
72





Three provisions in the CBD relate to biosafety directly or indirectly.
74
 These are Articles 
8 (g), 19 (3) and 19 (4). The negotiations for the Biosafety Protocol were based upon the 
provisions of Article 19(3),
75
 which compels parties to consider the need for a protocol 
on biosafety.
76
 Articles 8 (g) and 19 (4) of the CBD require parties to maintain, among 
other things, the means to regulate, control and manage risks associated with the use and 




The Convention does not set out detailed rules on GMOs other than placing a broad 
obligation on each party to provide other signatory states with information on the use and 
safety regulations that handling such organisms require, as well as the potential adverse 




3.3 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
3.3.1 Background  
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is the first international agreement specifically 
regulating GMOs.
79
 It was adopted in Montreal 2000 after nearly four years of 
negotiations.
80




 The Cartagena 
Protocol has a wide global ratification.
82
   The Protocol is widely accepted on the African 
                                                 
72
 Glazewski J, Environmental Law in South Africa, 2
nd




 Biosafety Guide, supra note 39 at 1.  
75
 Kameri Mbote P ‘Development of Biosafety Regulations in Africa in the Context of the Cartagena 
Protocol: Legal and Administrative Issues’ (2002) 11 (1) RECEIL 62 at 63. 
76
 Article 19.3. Convention on Biological Diversity. (CBD). 
77
 Kameri Mbote, supra note 75. 
78
 Sands P Principle of International Environmental Law 2
nd
 Ed 2003 at 522. 
79
 Although the Cartagena Protocol refers to LMOs and not GMOs, for purposes of this paper, the term 
GMO will be used. See Biosafety Guide, supra note 39. 
80




 As of January 2007, 139 members have ratified 




continent where 39 countries including South Africa and Uganda have so far ratified.
83
 






The Biosafety Protocol aims at specifically dealing with biotechnology.
85
 The Protocol is 
an international framework that regulates all GMOs.
86
 Its focal point is the transboundary 
movement of GMOs and their domestic regulation.
 87
 It provides as follows: 
 
‘In accordance with the precautionary principle contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an 
adequate level of protection in the field of transfer, handling and use of living modified organism 
resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into account risks to human health, and specifically 




Inclusion of reference to the precautionary principle on the outset of the objective clause 
is very significant. It ‘declares the precautionary approach to be the basis and the point of 
reference for the Protocol’.
89
 Therefore, the ‘precautious spirit’ ought to be applied to the 
provisions of the Protocol in its entirety.
90
 One of the major elements of the objective of 
the Protocol is to ‘contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection’.
91
 The Protocol 
does not attempt to set an absolute standard. However, it seeks to establish supplementary 
protection where protection is already being taken under other forms and frameworks.
92
 
The presumption therefore, is that additional action is being taken or needs to be taken in 
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addition to the protection under the Protocol.
93
 The level of protection envisaged is 
‘adequate’ and this subject to interpretation.
94
 This means that the level of protection will 




In developing countries many of which are still in the process of developing their 
Biosafety laws, it is doubtful whether the Protocol would render supplementary 
protection. Rather, it forms the basis upon which states seek to establish their Biosafety 
laws. As a result, it is questionable whether the objective of the Protocol to provide 
supplementary protection is being achieved in these countries.  
 
3.3.3 Scope 
The scope of the Protocol was one of the heavily debated areas during the negotiation 
process.
96
 This debate centered on finding an appropriate definition for GMOs.  This 
definition would determine the products to be regulated under the Protocol.
97
  While one 
group led by the United States argued for a narrow definition, involving genetically 
engineered organisms that are going to be released (for instance plants), other countries 
argued for a more inclusive definition; one that included all GMOs and their products.
98
 




The Protocol applies to all GMOs that may adversely effect on the conservation and the 
sustainable use of biological diversity. It applies to their transboundary movement,
100
 
transit, handling and use.
101
 This provision in effect spells out the activities to which the 
Protocol applies. It also specifies the subject matter or the organism to which the Protocol 
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applies; that is GMOs.
102
 Although ‘transit, handling and use’ are not defined in the 





Pharmaceuticals are excluded from the scope of the Protocol.
104
 In order for the exclusion 
to apply, three conditions must however prevail. First, there must be a transboundary 
movement of GMOs; the GMOs in question must be pharmaceuticals for humans; and 
thirdly, other international instruments must address the GMOs in question.
105
 
Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Protocol acknowledges the right of a party to subject 
all GMOs to risk assessment preceding any decision on imports.
106
 The advanced 
informed agreement procedure
107
 will not apply to such GMOs however; the GMOs will 
be subject to the risk assessment provisions and other provisions of the Protocol.
108
 The 





3.3.4 Advanced Informed Agreement  
The advance informed agreement (AIA) is the central mechanism, which regulates the 
transboundary movement of GMOs.
110
 This procedure, which is the ‘governance 
mechanism’ of the Biosafety Protocol, has its origins in the notion of ‘prior informed 
consent’ a renowned international environmental law principle.
111
 The argument for 
requiring an AIA is that governments reserve the right to know what crosses borders into 
their territory in order to ensure that the importation of new plants or animal species will 
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not cause environmental harm.
112
 The Protocol provides for an AIA procedure in respect 
of transboundary movement of GMOs intended for direct introduction into the 
environment.
113
 It requires that prior to the first intentional transboundary movement of 
GMOs, which are subject to the AIA procedure, the importing party must be notified of 
the intended movement and given an opportunity to decide whether to import the GMO 




The AIA procedure incorporates the precautionary principle. Accordingly, decisions 
made during the AIA procedure have to be based on the precautionary approach. It states 
that: 
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge 
regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organisms on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the party of import, taking into account 
risks to human health, shall not prevent the party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with 





The language of the Protocol in this regard appears to be equivocal. Different interest 
groups have sought to interpret it in a manner that suits their interests. The European 
Union and the developing world have hailed the inclusion of this provision as the most 
noteworthy contribution of the Biosafety Protocol.
116
 On the contrary, the United States 
and other representatives of the Biotechnology industry assert that the language of the 
Protocol does not go further than the discretion permitted to importers of risky products 
under the WTO regimes and its SPS Agreement.
117
 Clearly, there is no uniform 
interpretation of the principle. Ultimately, each state determines whether to apply and 
how to apply the principle. This renders the application of the principle almost nugatory.  
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Other provisions of the Protocol are equally relevant to the AIA procedure. Before any 
decision on importation is taken under the procedure, a risk assessment must be carried 
out.
118
 The National Competent Authorities are responsible for handling matters during 
the AIA procedure.
119
 The Protocol permits the notifier to identify information that 
should be treated as confidential by the importing party under the AIA procedure.
120
 
When making a decision on imports under the AIA procedure, the party of import may 
take into account socio-economic considerations.
121
 The Protocol details the information 
required in notifications
122




The AIA procedure does not apply to GMOs intended for direct use as FFP as noted 
earlier. Parties are obligated to inform the Biosafety Clearing House of a decision 
regarding GMOs intended for direct use as FFP within 15 days of making such a 
decision.
124
 The combination of the AIA procedure and the precautionary principle 
enables countries to reject the importation of certain GMOs, whose safety they are 




3.4.5 Risk Assessment 
It is important to assess risk in order to identify and evaluate the possible adverse effects 
of GMOs on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and human 
health.
126
 This is often necessary at various stages in the development and use of 
GMOs.
127
 Additionally, risk assessment is important since it helps in decision-making 
and is regarded by some commentators as ‘the backbone of the decision making 
process.
128
  Risk assessment is the key element of the AIA procedure.
129
 However, it does 
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not only occur in the context of the AIA procedure
130





The Protocol makes provision for risk assessment where is states that risk assessments 
must to be undertaken in a manner that is ‘scientifically sound’, in accordance with 
Annex III to the Protocol and recognized risk assessment techniques.
132
 Annex III 
contains detailed guidance on the application of the risk assessment.
133
 It sets down 
certain principles, for example; the need for the risk assessment to be carried out in an 
approach that is scientifically sound and transparent; the need to consider the risks in the 
perspective of risks posed by non-modified parental organisms; and the need to conduct 
the risk assessment on a case-by-case basis.
134
 The Annex further describes the 
methodologies for risk assessments, including generic steps common to risk assessment 
frameworks.  
 
It is argued that the guidance provided by Annex III is generally consistent with accepted 
principles and methodology for risk assessment notwithstanding that the specific 
description and terminology of the steps in risk assessment differ among frameworks. 
Risk assessment was one of the controversial issues during the negotiations of the 
protocol which controversy centered on the inclusion of the precautionary principle and 




3.3.6 Risk Management 
Risk management is an important tool used to regulate, control and manage the risks 
identified under the risk assessment procedure.
136
 The Protocol provides for management 
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of risks identified in the risk assessment procedure under the Protocol.
137
 Parties are 
required not only to establish, but also to maintain appropriate mechanisms, measures and 
strategies to regulate, manage and control risks identified in the risk management 
provisions of the protocol.
138
 As one of the risk management measures, the Protocol 
requires each party to ensure that living modified organisms both imported and locally 
developed undergo a period of observation proportionate to its life cycle. This has to be 




3.3.7 The Precautionary Principle 
This principle has its origins in the rise of environmentalism in Germany. It is often 
invoked in respect of wide ranging environmental issues including environmental 
protection, hazardous wastes and GMOs.
140
 The most often cited definition of the 
principle is enshrined in the Rio Declaration, 
141
which provides that:  
 
‘…where there are threats of serious irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty will not 




The Protocol provides for the right of parties to take decisions based on the precautionary 
principle.
143
 Accordingly, ‘lack of scientific certainty shall not prevent countries from 
barring the importation of GMOs.’
144
 The Protocol applies precaution to biodiversity as 
well as the risks to human health.
145
 The preamble and Article 1 setting out the objectives 
of the Protocol both refer to the precautionary principle. 
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A major problem underlying the application of the precautionary principle in biosafety is 
the potential conflict between environmental protection and economic protection.
146
  It is 
argued concerning the precautionary principle in the Protocol that, its inclusion does not 
amount to an obligation on the parties.
147
 Rather it is a guarantee of the right to do so. 
This view is plausible given that the Protocol does express the principle in terms that are 
somewhat different from its original expression in the Rio Declaration.  Furthermore it is 
worth noting that the inclusion of this principle in the Protocol was subject of intense 
contention during the negotiations.
148
 The ‘Like-Minded’ group, comprising mainly 
developing countries advocated for the inclusion of the precautionary principle to guide 
decision-making. The ‘Miami Group’ including the likes of the United States and Canada, 




3.3.8 Socio-economic Considerations 
Integrating socio-economic consideration in biosafety decision-making is acknowledged 
as a major challenge.
150
 Nonetheless, it is imperative that this takes place given the 
numerous socio-economic considerations associated with the development, release and 
use of these organisms. Relevant concerns include: the potential for GM strains to 
contaminate organic strains; competition between traditional organic crops and their GM 
counterparts; the impact on traditional seed stocking activities; the burden created to 
farmers by the intellectual property rights associated with the GM crops; and the financial 
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The Protocol provides, in rather discretionary terms, that parties ‘may’ take into account 
socio-economic considerations in reaching decisions under the Protocol.
152
 Article 26 
suggests that not all socio-economic considerations will be taken into account, rather, 
only those that arise from the impact of GMOs on biological diversity.
153
 When taking 
into account socio-economic considerations, parties are obliged to comply with their 
other international obligations.
154
 These would include obligations under the WTO 
Agreements such as the SPS; TBT; and GATT.
155
 This provision was inserted following 
concerns that including socio-economic considerations in decision-making on GMO 
imports might create trade barriers.
156
 The Protocol does not give guidance on how socio-
economic considerations are to be taken into account for instance procedure for assessing 
socio-economic impacts in risk assessments.
157
 Further, conditions such as ‘compliance 
with other international obligations’, water down the provision. 
 
3.3.9 Public Awareness and Participation 
Public participation and transparency in decision-making are acknowledged as vitally 
important components of good governance and sustainable development.
158
 It is 
important that the views of all stakeholders be taken into account in decision-making 
through a meaningful and well-informed public participation process.
159
 Biosafety 
decisions, such as those relating to the release of GMOs into the environment, may affect 
the public in those areas where these trials take place. 
 
The Biosafety Protocol provides for public awareness and participation.
160
 It exhorts 
parties to promote and facilitate public awareness, education and participation in dealing 
with GMOs.
161
 The language of the provision appears to be ‘soft’ as it does not impose a 
mandatory obligation on parties to make information available to the public or provide 
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for public participation. Rather parties are required to ‘promote and facilitate’, access to 
information and public participation.
 162
  This is concerning.  
 
3.3.10 Handling, Identification and Packaging 
Labelling of food products has long been a cause of legal debate mainly due to the health 
implications and trade implications.
163
 Labeling is important especially because it enables 




The Biosafety Protocol provides for handling, transport, packaging and identification of 
GMOs.
165
 It obliges parties to ensure that GMOs that are subject to transboundary 
movement are handled, packaged and transported under safe conditions taking into 
account relevant international rules and standards.
166
 Additionally, it requires parties to 
ensure that GMOs intended for FFP are accompanied by documentation identifying the 
GMOs and providing contacts of persons responsible for their movement.
167
 The 
language of the Protocol is rather ambiguous as far as it requires GMOs intended for FFP 
to be marked ‘may contain’ GMOs. 
168
 Hence, the Biosafety Protocol has no mandatory 




This position reflects a compromise that the negotiating parties agreed to after having 
disagreed on the issue of labeling. Notably, at the third meeting of the parties to the 
Cartagena Protocol held in March 2006 in Brazil, it was agreed that, parties would from 
then on require a label stating ‘contains GMOs’ instead of the former.
170
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3.3.11 Liability, Redress and Compensation 
GMOs are considerably different from other products insofar as they are likely to 
intermingle with other wild organisms when introduced into the environment.
171
 Their 
introduction into the environment therefore raises many concerns. For instance, the 
potential for transgenic varieties to out-perform other varieties leading to the 
displacement of wild species; and the potential for the contamination of organic species 
by transgenic seeds.
172
  Liability for damage caused by GMOs ought to be viewed in a 
broad context, which takes into account the property rights attached to these 
organisms.
173
 GMOs are often protected by intellectual property rights, largely patents 
and can only be used with permission.
174
 In practice however, GMOs that have been 
introduced into the environment often go beyond the environment in which they have 
been introduced. Where the patented organism is a seed and such seed finds their way 
into the lands of a farmer who does not grow transgenic crops, and therefore, does not 
pay royalties to the company holding the patent, the patent holder may claim for 




It is no surprise, therefore, that many countries set very stringent regulation when it 
comes to the use or release of GMOs or products containing GMOs.
176
 The situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that there is so much uncertainty about their potential impact and 
it cannot currently be entirely ruled out that these impacts are hazardous.
177
 Liability and 
redress is one legal response to harm arising from legal or illegal activities relating to 
GMOs.
178
 Liability rules may serve three potential functions: prevention, reparation, or 
correction.
179
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Liability under the Biosafety Protocol was one of the highly contested issues during the 
negotiations with developing countries pushing for a system of liability and redress in the 
event of harm caused by GMOs.
180
 The developing countries wanted clear rules 
regarding who can claim compensation, from whom and for what type of damages, 
GMOs may cause to the environment, human health and socio-economic interests.
181
 
This demand was however rejected by the developed countries. Consequent to the 
disagreement surrounding this issue, the provisions of the Protocol relating to Liability 
and Redress, reflect a compromise.
182
 The Protocol does not provide a liability regime; 




Following the first meeting of the COPs, held in Kuala Lumpur early 2004, some 
progress was noted. Parties agreed that an ad hoc working group of legal and technical 
experts would commence work and present their final report on proposed international 
rules and procedures by 2007.
184
 The failure of the Protocol to provide a liability and 
redress regime is undoubtedly one of its major flaws.  
 
3.3.12 Confidential Information 
During the negotiations of the Protocol, a number of countries lobbied for a clause on 
confidential information to be included.
185
 Their justification was that information 
provided to importing countries during AIA procedures might contain confidential 
proprietary information. This view met opposition from those of the belief that constraint 
on disclosure would hamper the ability of parties to deal with emergencies involving 
GMOs. Consequently, Article 21 reflects the compromise and it permits certain 
information to be treated as confidential. It specifies in broad terms, the general 
procedure for ensuring protection of confidential information and sets out a broad 
obligation to protect confidential information received under the Protocol, for instance; 
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information obtained in accordance with Annex I;
186
 or information acquired during the 
AIA procedure.
187
 The type of information that should not be subject of confidentiality is 
also specified and it includes; the name and address of the notifier (the party providing 
information); a general description of the living modified organisms; a summary of the 




It is noted that while Article 21, makes provision for certain information to be treated as 
confidential, this requirement is not tantamount to a general rule.
189
 The discretion is on 
the notifier to specify the information they consider should be treated confidential and 
then to consult with the party of import.  Although the notifier is required to justify why 
the information in question should be treated as confidential, the Protocol does not 




3.4 The African Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology: 
The former Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the African Model Law
191
 in 
2001 to cater for biosafety in Africa in reaction to concerns about the adverse effects of 
biotechnology on human health, biodiversity and the environment.
192
 The African Model 
law uses the discretion given to the parties under the Biosafety Protocol, to adopt more 
protective measures than the agreed minimum set out in the Protocol.
193
 Although the 
Model Law is not legally binding, African states are, however, encouraged to rely on its 
provisions when enacting their domestic laws in an attempt to harmonize existing and 
future domestic biosafety regulation in Africa.
194
 It is argued that the adoption of this law 
will enable governments to enact biosafety regulations that are based on a broad and 
unified framework.
195
 This Law is of significant relevance therefore when considering the 
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biosafety regimes in South Africa and Uganda. The subsequent section will briefly 
highlight key aspects of the Model Law.  
 
3.4.1 Scope 
The ambit of the African Model Law is far broader than that of the Biosafety Protocol. It 
applies to the import, export, transit, contained use, release and placing on the market of 
all GMOs and GMO products regardless of whether they are intended for release into the 
environment, for use as pharmaceuticals, or for FFP.
196
 The Model Law sets up uniform 
provisions, which apply to all these activities because it views the risks from GMOs as 




3.4.2 Advanced Informed Agreement  
The Model Law contains provisions on the AIA. It sets out the different GMO related 
activities that require prior consent including import, transit and contained use.
198
 The 
AIA envisaged under the Model Law is similar to the one in the Biosafety Protocol in the 
sense that it applies to the transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms. 
However, the AIA under the Model Law has a wider scope of application as it also 
applies to all GMOs and their related activities. Under the Protocol, the AIA does not 
apply to certain GMOs such as those intended for contained use as noted earlier.
199
 
Article 4 of the Model Law expressly states that,  
 
‘No person shall import, transit, carryout the contained use of or release of a genetically 
modified organism or a product of a genetically modified organism without an advanced 
informed agreement or the explicit written approval of a competent authority whichever 
is appropriate.’ 
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Evidently, the Model Law requires the prior informed consent of importing countries, 




3.4.3 Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle is far more strictly incorporated in the Model Law than in the 
Biosafety Protocol.
201
 Accordingly, no approvals are to be made unless there is enough 
evidence to prove that the GMOs do not pose any serious danger to human health, the 
environment and biodiversity.
202
 Similarly, where risk assessment indicates that risk 
cannot be avoided, approval for use, import or any other use is to be denied.
203
 The 
application of the precautionary principle therefore permeates both risk assessment and 
decision-making.  
 
3.4.4 Public Participation 
Public participation is comprehensively provided for in the Model Law.
204
 It stresses that 
the time with in which the public is expected to comment must be long enough to ensure 
meaningful public reaction.
205
 In addition, the Model Law affords competent authorities a 
wide discretion to determine on a case-to-case basis, the time within which the public is 
to comment.
206
 More importantly, public comments must be taken into account by the 
competent authority in decision-making.
207
 The provisions guarantee access to crucial 
information concerning GMOs.
208
 Access to information on approvals granted and denied 
relating to contained use, release or placing on the market is guaranteed. In addition, 
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3.4.5 Labelling and Identification 
According to Kiss and Shelton, labelling requirements are not a new phenomenon in the 
context of food safety. They have previously been used to specify information on the 
nutritional content of foods and the proper use and hazards of cleaning products.
210
 Hence, 
labelling not only provides information on the product, it also acts as a tool for managing 
risks.
211
  Unlike the Biosafety Protocol, the Model Law addresses the issue of labelling in 
very clear and precise terms. Article 11 states that GMOs and their products should be 
labelled and identified in such a manner to indicate that they are GMOs. In addition, 
sufficient information must be included for purposes of traceability. 
 
3.4.6 Liability and Redress 
GMOs are very complex and hold the potential for causing substantial damage. Clearly 
defined provisions for liability and redress are therefore essential. Unlike the Biosafety 
Protocol, the Model Law extends liability to the supplier and developer of a GMO in 
addition to the end user.
212
 Besides extending liability to suppliers and developers, the 
Model Law also prescribes strict liability.
213
 The determination of the liability of the 
responsible party will therefore not be dependant on fault.  
 
The Model Law also addresses issues of redress, specifically compensation. It states for 
instance, that in case of damage to the environment, compensation will include clean up, 
rehabilitation and reinstatement costs.
214
 The Model Law grants legal standing to persons 
or groups of persons who want to sue in the public interest.
215
 In addition, provision is 
made for exonerating applicants from potential legal cost orders if the applicants are 
unsuccessful.
216
 The liability provisions in the Model Law are particularly essential in the 
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The Biosafety Protocol, which is the most important international instrument on biosafety, 
does lay down minimum standards for biosafety and imposes broad obligations on party 
states. The broad obligations and the generally minimum standards may be attributed to 
the several competing interest that were represented during its negotiation. Accordingly, 
it reflects a compromise. Its major weakness is arguably the failure to provide a liability 
and redress mechanism.
218
 In addition, although the Protocol provides for risk assessment, 
it has no discussion on what level of safety is adequate before the approval of a GMO.
219
  
Further, it makes no suggestion as to how much potential risk must be identified to justify 
withholding of consent.
220
 The Protocol does not provide for what happens after a risk 
assessment is conducted and potential risks are identified. It leaves the discretion to each 
country to decide what safety standards they believe must be satisfied before consenting 
to the use or importation of a GMO.
221
 As far as socio economic considerations are 
concerned, the Protocol provides in weak terms that these may be taken into account but 
does not specify how these are to be included in the procedures under the Protocol.
222
 Not 
all major risks associated with GMOs are comprehensively addressed by the Protocol. It 
does not address substantially human health related or food safety concerns surrounding 
GMOs. It is noted that these are arguably greater concerns than biodiversity risks.
223
 The 
greatest strength of the Protocol is arguably, the endorsement of the precautionary 
principle.
224
  In enacting their domestic legislation on biosafety, parties are expected to 
rely on the standards set by the Protocol. However, the Protocol gives states discretion to 




The African Model Law on the other hand, is more comprehensive and deals far more 
robustly with most of the controversial issues in biosafety regulation. Some of its strong 
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 Ibid at 12. 
225




points are: the inclusion of the precautionary principle; provision for comprehensive risk 




The subsequent sections will now consider and compare the adequacy of South Africa 
and Uganda’s biosafety regimes. This will be done in the context set out by the foregoing 
discussion of biosafety under international instruments. Therefore the discussion will 
adopt the key themes previously discussed which include; scope, risk assessment and 
management, liability and redress, public participation and socio-economic 
considerations when undertaking a critique of the two regimes.  
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AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BIOSAFETY REGIME 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The relevant framework for biosafety regulation in South Africa consists of a fragmented 
array of framework and sectoral laws.
227
 These include: the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa;
228
 the Genetically Modified Organisms Act and their Regulations;
229
 the 
Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Bill;
230
the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act;
231
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act;
232
 the National 
Environmental Management Act;
233
 the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act;
234
 
and the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act.
235
 In addition, several 
other policy documents are relevant in the context of biosafety regulation such as; Draft 
Biosafety Policy;
236
 Agricultural Biotechnology Strategy;
237
 GMO Guidelines (Advisory 
Committee);
238
 and GMO Guidelines.
239
 This section provides an overview of these 
relevant laws and their relevance to biosafety. 
4.2 Principal Legislation 
 
4.2.1 The Genetically Modified Organisms Act 
The Genetically Modified Organisms Act (hereinafter the GMO Act),
240
 is the main law 
that regulates GMOs in South Africa. The Act does not contain a section that explicitly 
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states what its objectives are. Rather these are couched in its preamble,
241
 which provides 
that the GMO Act is intended to ‘promote the responsible development, production, use 
and application of genetically modified organisms.
242
 The GMO Act applies to a range of 
activities including the genetic modification of organisms, development, production, 
release, use and application of genetically modified organisms and use of gene therapy.
243
 
However, it excludes certain activities such as techniques involving human gene 
therapy.
244
   
 
The Act establishes a number of institutions to undertake its administration and 
implementation. These are the Executive Council of Genetically Modified Organisms 
(the Council), the Advisory Committee and the office of the Registrar.
245
 The Council is 
charged with the role of advising the Minister and making decisions concerning granting 
of permits.
246
 The Advisory Committee is the national advisory body on all matters 
concerning GMOs.
247





As far as enforcement is concerned, the Act provides for inspectors who are empowered 
to enter premises and carry out inspection for purposes of ensuring that the Act is being 
observed.
249
 The Act contains some obscure provisions entitled ‘determination of risks 
and liability’ that attempt to set out the liability and risk management regime.
250
 In 
addition, the Act provides for offence and penalty provisions.
251
 The Minister is 
specifically empowered to prohibit any activities involving GMOs on the 
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recommendation of the Council.
252
A right of appeal is reserved for parties who are 
aggrieved by the decisions of the Council.
253
 The Act provides for confidentiality relating 
to information contained in applications.
254
 The Act also provides for the enactment of 
Regulations under section 20. The primary focus of the GMO Act appears to be the 




4.2.2 The GMO Regulations 
Regulations have been enacted under section 20 of the GMO Act. They came into 
operation on 1 December 1999. The Regulations establish a permitting regime in terms of 
which various activities, including the use and release of GMOs may not be carried out 
without a permit.
256
 The application procedure is prescribed.
257
 Facilities engaged in 




A Risk assessment is required before any activities involving genetic modification may 
be carried out.
259
 A procedure for public notification of intended releases of GMOs is 
prescribed.
260
 Measures to be taken in the case of accidents are set out
261
 as are provisions 
for effective waste management.
262
 Finally, the Regulations prescribe detailed procedures 




4.2.3 The Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Bill 
South Africa acceded to the Biosafety Protocol on 14 August 2003.
264
 Following the 
coming into force of the Biosafety Protocol in November 2003, amendments to the GMO 
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Act were proposed in order to bring it in line with the Protocol.
265
 This process 
culminated in the publication of the GMO Amendment Bill.
266
   
 
The purpose of the GMO Amendment Bill is set forth in its Preamble. It seeks among 
others to revise certain definitions and incorporate new ones. The definition of ‘accident’ 
is revised by removing from it certain phrases and replacing these with alternative 
phrases.
267
In addition, an alternative definition for accident is provided.
268
 New 







 and environmental impact assessment.
272
  The Bill also seeks to amend the 
provisions concerning institutions. Accordingly, the composition, remuneration, powers, 
and functions of the various institutions are amended.
273
 Procedures relating to 
application for and issuance of permits are explained under the Bill.
274
 The GMO 
Amendment Bill makes provision for risk assessment and liability.
275
 It amends the 
confidentiality clause and the offence and penalty provisions.
276
 Finally, the Bill makes 
provision for procedures under the appeal process.
277
 Although the GMO Amendment 
Bill seeks to amend a wide range of issues under the GMO Act, it however, does not 
adequately address those issues and the amendments are generally made in a piece meal 
manner.
278
 A critique of relevant provisions of the Amendment Bill will be included in 
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4.3 The Policy documents  
 
4.3.1 Biosafety Policy 
In August of 2005, a Draft Biosafety Policy
279
 was published. The Biosafety Policy 
applies to current and future applications of GMOs including contained use, controlled 
and uncontrolled release in agriculture, human and veterinary medicine.
280
 The Biosafety 
Policy will facilitate the establishment of safeguards, vital for maximizing the benefits 
while minimizing the risks of biotechnology.
281
 The Policy will promote sustainable 
development through providing mechanisms for the safe use of biotechnology.
282
 The 
Policy acknowledges the potential risks of biotechnology to human and animal health and 
the environment. It also states key factors to be taken into account in biosafety such as 
socio-economics, public awareness, education, participation and access to information.  
 
The Biosafety Policy seeks to set up uniform measures and requirements for risk 
assessment, EIA and assessments of socio-economic impact.
283
 In addition, it seeks to 
promote and facilitate access to information in biosafety regulation.
284
 The Biosafety 
Policy is important as it sets forth the aspirations of South Africa and the course that it 
wishes to take in the context of biosafety regulation. Consequently, national legislation 
relating to biosafety should reflect the ideals that are set out in the Biosafety Policy.  
 




 (Advisory Committee) were established in accordance with section 5 
of the GMO Act, which calls for the development, and publication of guidelines for all 
uses of GMOs.
286
 The Guidelines aim to do the following; provide general additional 
information on the GMO Act provisions; the institutions created there under and the 
                                                 
279
 Department of Agriculture Publication of Draft Biosafety Policy for Comments GN 1576/2005 in GG 










 Ibid.  
285
 GN 1047/2004 in GG 26422 dated 11 June 2004.  
286




application process for permits.
287
 The Guidelines provide for among others, procedure 
for risk identification and process for risk assessment, for a fast tracking mechanism and 




4.3.3 Guideline Documents for Work with Genetically Modified Organisms 
This Guidelines
289
 document herein after (General Guidelines) were similarly enacted 
under section 5 of the GMO Act. They are also meant to provide general information on 
the provisions of the Act, on the functioning of its institutions and the application process 
for permits.
290
 The General Guidelines are meant to complement the GMO Regulations. 
The responsibilities of applicants/permit holders and farmers/companies engaged in 
GMO activities are set out in these Guidelines.
291
 They also set out potential adverse 





4.4 Other Relevant Legislation 
 
4.4.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and any other law that is inconsistent 
with it is invalid.
293
 The Constitution is relevant to the question of biosafety regulation in 
at least three different ways. Firstly, it enshrines the environmental human right in its Bill 
of Rights. It states: 
 
Everyone has the right to (a) an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of the present and future generations, 
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The inclusion of the environmental right is significant in that all the environmental 
related laws must be consistent with this right. Further, the GMO Act and their 
Regulations as amended
295
 may be argued to be legislative measures by the government 
to protect the environment from harm resulting from release of GMOs into the 
environment, which could potentially affect the human health.  
 
Secondly, the Constitution prescribes the right of access to information.
296
 It guarantees 
access to information held by the state and any other person where such information is 
required for the protection of any other rights such as the environmental right.
297
 The 
GMO Act has to be consistent with the constitutional provision on access to information 
particularly because activities such as the release of GMOs into the environment have the 
potential to infringe on the environmental right. The GMO Act unfortunately is 
inconsistent with the Constitution as will be discussed in the critique that follows in 
chapter five. 
 
Thirdly, the Constitution guarantees the right to just administrative action.
298
 
Administrative action must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
299
 In addition, 
persons whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action are entitled to 
written reasons.
300
 The GMO Act must be consistent with these constitutional provisions, 
as the Constitution is the supreme law. More so, as decisions made by the institutions 
under the GMO Act constitute administrative action.
301
 The GMO Act is not entirely 
consistent with the constitutional provisions on just administrative action. Details of its 




                                                 
295
 Including the GMO Amendment Bill. 
296
 Section 32 of the Constitution. 
297
 Section 32.1 (a) and (b), the Constitution. 
298
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
299
 Section 33.1 of the Constitution. 
300
 Section 33.2 of the Constitution. 
301
 Section of 1(a) ii PAJA, supra note 231.  Administrative action includes any action taken by an organ of 




4.4.2 Promotion of Access to Information Act  
The Constitutional right of access to information is given effect through the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act (PAIA).
302
 A party seeking to access information held by the 
state or a private citizen may apply to court where such information is needed to protect 
or enforce their rights; such as the environmental right. For biosafety purposes, the 
provisions of the PAIA may be invoked for instance, where parties interested in the 
public participation process require information to enable them make comments on a 
proposed activity. The Biowatch case
303
 Biowatch an NGO obtained a court order 
compelling the Registrar of GMOs to make available certain information pertaining to the 
commercial release of GMOs. Although the case was not brought under the provisions of 
PAIA, as it was not yet in force, it would have been appropriate to invoke its provisions 
had it been operational. PAIA makes provision for grounds for refusal of access.
304
 





4.4.3 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) seeks to give effect to the 
Constitutional right to just administrative action.
306
 Just administrative action must be 





PAJA also makes provision for judicial review where it details the grounds, procedure 
and the remedies for judicial review.
308
 The PAJA is a very important tool especially in 
the context of permitting of GMOs. Persons aggrieved by decisions granting or denying 
permits for GMO related activities, may rely on its provisions and seek recourse from the 
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courts. Similarly, institutions created under the GMO Act are enjoined to ensure that they 
comply with the provisions of the PAJA in making decisions under the Act. Thus, the 
relevance of the PAJA may be viewed as two fold. For persons seeking to engage in 
GMO related activities, the provisions of the PAJA are relevant in seeking redress where 
they have been aggrieved by administrative decisions such as a refusal to grant permits. 
On the other hand, persons opposing the granting of permits may invoke the provisions of 
the PAJA where they have not received fair administrative action.  
 
4.4.4 The National Environmental Management Act 
The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) is the principal framework 
legislation for environmental protection in South Africa, which gives effect to 24 of the 
Constitution. The Act contains a number of crucial tools that could be used to enhance 




NEMA prescribes a set of principles which all organs of state whose actions ‘may 
significantly’ affect the environment must apply.
310
 The regulatory bodies established 
under the GMO Act, such as the Executive Council, are therefore bound to consider these 
principles when exercising their functions and making decisions under the Act. It is 
currently uncertain whether these principles are being taken into account by the relevant 
authorities.
311
 Notable principles include; the principle of sustainable development;
312
 







 and the polluter pays principle.
316
   
 
NEMA requires that the potential impact of certain listed activities on the environment 
must be investigated and assessed before any authorization is granted for them to take 
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 An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a tool that is used in decision-
making.
318
 A list of activities identified in terms of section 24 of NEMA
319
 lays down 
activities that may not be undertaken without EIAs. The release of GMOs into the 
environment is one such ‘listed activity’.
320
 The inclusion of the release of GMOs under 
the listed activities is crucial since the GMO Act does not provide for mandatory EIAs 
and risk assessment.
321
 These provisions may be relied upon to demand for mandatory 
EIAs preceding release of GMOs into the environment.  
 
NEMA’s duty of care provisions are also of potential relevance.
322
 Any form of damage 
resulting from GMO related activities may trigger these provisions, which impose 




NEMA prescribes what form of ‘reasonable measures’ must be taken by persons 
responsible for causing ‘significant pollution’ or degradation of the environment.
324
 
Although the Act does not define ‘significant pollution’, it defines pollution as follows:  
 
‘pollution means any change in the environment caused by substances, radioactive or other waves 
or noise, odours, dust or heat, emitted from any activity, including the storage or treatment of 
waste or substances, construction and the provision of services, whether engaged in by any person 
or organ of state, where that change has adverse effects on human health or well being or on the 
composition, resilience and the productivity of natural or managed ecosystems, or on material 




Pollution is very broadly defined and this could include the slightest change in conditions. 
This provision could arguably encompass damage caused by GMOs especially since the 
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courts have considered the threshold in ‘significant’ as low.
326
 Reasonable measures 
envisaged under NEMA include containing or preventing the movement of the pollutant 
or the cause of the degradation and eliminating the source of the pollution.
327
 In case of a 
pollution incident resulting from GMOs, responsible persons may be compelled to take 
reasonable measures relying on these provisions.   
 
NEMA’s emergency incidents provisions may also be relevant in the GMO context.
328
 
An ‘emergency incident’ is defined to mean an ‘…unexpected sudden occurrence that 
may cause serious danger to the public or potentially serious pollution or detriment to the 
environment’.
329
 NEMA obliges persons responsible for such incidents to not only report 
but also take reasonable measures to contain the situation.
330
 The escape of GMOs from a 
laboratory causing detrimental effects to the environment may be classified under 
‘emergency incidents’. In such circumstances, these provisions may be relied upon to 
compel responsible persons to take reasonable measures.  
 
Access to information is provided for in NEMA.
331
 This provision enables every person 
to have access to information held by the state or its organs affecting the environment. 
This provision would be useful for purposes of accessing information especially in the 
absence of similar provisions in the GMO Act.  
 
Section 32 provides for legal standing in environmental litigation. It empowers persons to 
bring action under NEMA and any other law in the interest of environmental protection. 
Since GMO related activities pose environmental risks, these provisions may be applied 
to institute action in that regard. 
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4.4.5 The Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act 
The Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act (FCDA), regulates the safety of all 
foodstuffs in South Africa and this includes foodstuffs derived from GMOs.
332
 This Act 
is relevant in light of the fact that it provides for safety assessment of foodstuffs including 
products of GMOs. Particularly so because imported food which contains products of 
GMOs or processed GM foods fall outside the scope of the GMO Act.
333
 The GMO Act 
contains no food safety provisions. 
 
In January 2004, Regulations on the labeling of foodstuffs derived from certain 
techniques of genetic modification were published.
334
 The Regulations make provision 
for mandatory and voluntary labeling of foodstuff acquired through certain techniques of 




4.4.6 The National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act 
The National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act (NEMBA) reforms all laws 
of South Africa regulating Biodiversity.
336
 Its objectives include; providing for the 
management and conservation of biological diversity; giving effect to international 
agreements relating to biodiversity; and establishing the South African National 
Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) among others.
337
  The Department of Agriculture must in 
accordance with NEMBA, through the implementation of the GMO Act manage, 
conserve and sustain South Africa’s Biodiversity.
338
 SANBI is charged with the duty to 
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NEMBA defines alien species to mean ‘a species that is not indigenous species’.
340
  Alien 
species may arguably include GMOs as these are not indigenous to the environment in 
which they are released. Therefore, NEMBA’s provisions on alien species may arguably 
apply to GMOs.
341
 Alien species may not be introduced into new ecosystems without 
authorization.
342
 In addition, restricted activities involving aliens may not be carried out 
without a permit.
343
 Furthermore, NEMBA refers to the GMO Act under its invasive 
species provisions.
344
 An invasive specie ‘means any specie whose establishment and 
spread outside of its natural distribution range may result in environmental harm or harm 
to health’.
345
 The Minister for National Environmental Management may deny the grant 
of permit under the GMO Act if they believe that such grant will pose a threat to the 
environment or indigenous species.
346
 As should be evident from the above overview, 
South Africa’s legal regime of relevance to biosafety regulation is rather fragmented and 
inadequate in various respects. The strengths and weaknesses of the current regime are 
discussed below.  
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CRITIQUE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BIOSAFETY REGIME 
 
5.1 Objectives and Scope of the GMO Act 
The objectives of the GMO Act are incorporated within its preamble. Notable among the 
objectives is the reference to ‘promote the responsible development, production, use and 
application of GMOs’. This provision is regarded as unsatisfactory as law, which is 
meant to regulate the technology, should not be the same one promoting it.
347
 The 
preamble to the GMO Act gives the distinct impression that the law is biased towards 
promoting the technology while the objective of biosafety regulation should arguably be 




The GMO Act has a narrow scope of application, which excludes products of GMOs.
349
 
The Act applies to the following activities; genetic modification of organisms; 
development, production, release, use and application of genetically modified organisms; 
and the use of gene therapy.
350
 Mayet notes that the reference to genetic modification 
envisages only the process of genetic modification. There is no reference whatsoever to 
GMO products thereby excluding them from the ambit of the Act. Foodstuffs derived 
from GMOs, such as corn and soya may pose a danger to the environment even after 
having gone through the intestinal tracts of humans and animals.
351
 These products 
should therefore be subject to regulation. The objectives and scope of the GMO Act 
appear to be inadequate in that respect. 
 
5.2 Institutional Arrangements 
As is previously mentioned, the GMO Act establishes regulatory institutions such as the 
Executive Council, the Registrar and the Advisory Committee.
352
 A number of crucial 
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issues arise concerning these regulatory bodies such as their powers and functions; - the 
discretionary nature of these powers and functions; and their composition.  
 
Firstly, it is noted that the Minister of Agriculture has unfettered discretion over the 
composition of these bodies, which potentially undermines their independence.
353
 In 
addition, civil society is unrepresented on such bodies as the advisory committee which 
comprises predominantly of members from the scientific community.
354
 This is 
regrettable because GMOs require a multidisciplinary approach to ensure that that 
evaluation of potential risks is done from a broader perspective.
355
 These institutions 





The Council is given lots of powers and discretion without any apparent obligations in 
performing their duties.
357
 The Amendment Bill appears to exacerbate the state of things 
by giving more power to the Registrar under section 6 of the Amendment Bill.
358
 Mayet 
points out that given that the entire co-ordination of the biosafety regulatory system will 
depend on the Registrar there ought to be some checks and balances, which are currently 
absent.  
 
On positive note however, the Amendment Bill grants the Council very important powers 
with respect to issuing of permits; the power to reconsider decisions that have been taken 
with respect to issuing of permits.
359
 This power to review decisions is vital as new 
information can be taken into consideration subsequent to the initial grant of a permit.
360
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5.3 Risk Assessment 
It is internationally acknowledged that authorizing GMO related activities should be done 
on a precautious basis.
361
 GMOs are a relatively new area and there is not a lot of 





The GMO Act and its Regulations do not adequately provide for risk assessment. First, 
the GMO Act fails to prescribe specific mandatory principles for risk assessment. Rather, 
it relies on the use of the voluntary guidelines, which are non-binding in nature.
363
 
Secondly, risk assessments and environmental impact assessments are not mandatory in 
terms of the GMO Act.
364
 The Council ‘may’ require an applicant for a permit to submit 
as assessment of risks and ‘where required’ an assessment of the impacts on the 
environment.
365
 The language of the provision appears to grant the Council the discretion 
to determine when a risk assessment and environmental impact assessment will be 
required.  Regulation 3 (1), which on the face of it appears to require the Council to 
consider the risks and environmental impacts before making decisions regarding the grant 
of permits, only applies to ‘genetic modification’.
366
 Although ‘genetic modification’ is 
not defined in the GMO Act, it does not appear to include activities such as the release of 




The recent EIA Regulations
368
 promulgated under section 24 of the NEMA list the 
release of genetically modified organism into the environment as one of the activities 
requiring an EIA before authorisation. NEMA’s EIA Regulations, which on the face of it 
appear to redress the situation, do not actually do so as they only require mandatory EIA 
where the release of GMOs into the environment is required by the GMO Act.
369
 This 
position is rather absurd, as the GMO Act does not require mandatory EIA prior to the 
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release of GMOs. It is the environmental impact resulting from the release of GMOs into 
the environment that raises concerns, which should ideally be investigated before 




The Amendment Bill one of whose objectives is to provide for risk assessment 
determinations does not adequately address the issue of risk assessment. It unfortunately 
introduces the ‘WTO language’ to be applied in risk assessment by reference to 
‘scientifically based assessment’.
371
 The introduction of this concept is particularly 





The Biosafety Protocol specifically refers to socio economic considerations that parties 
may take into account when carrying out risk assessments.
373
 One socio-economic 





The GMO Act, the Regulations and the Guidelines do not refer to these considerations.  
The Amendment Bill refers to socio-economic considerations in very ambiguous 
terms.
375
 It appears to make a distinction between the scientific-based risk assessment, 
environmental impact assessment and socio-economic considerations. It is submitted that 
the position should rather be one that integrates socio-economic considerations in risk 
assessment and environmental impact assessment.  
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5.4 Liability Regime 
Liability regimes are fairly common today and they include damage caused by GMOs to 
the environment.
376
  Liability regimes are intended to provide a remedy in instances 
where damage occurs.
377
 Commenting on the liability provision in the GMO Act, Mayet 
states that they are ‘astonishing’. The Act attempts to protect the developers of GMOs 




As noted by Eastwood, this is a very unfair situation as users, such as consumers, may 
not even be aware that they are dealing with GMOs considering that there are no 
labelling requirements in the GMO Act.
379
 This is inconsistent with the basic tenets of 
fairness, equity and the ‘polluter pays’ principle entrenched in NEMA.
380
 According to 
the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the person responsible for the damage such as the initial 
developer of the products, should be responsible for remediation. 
 
The liability provisions in the GMO Act are further inadequate in many respects. The Act 
does not set out the scope of the damage envisaged
381
 it rather prescribes quite 
ambiguously, that users have to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to avoid 
adverse effect on the environment.
382
 Clearly, the Act refers only to damage to the 
environment that should be taken into account. This is rather unacceptable given that 
GMOs will, in addition most frequently affect human and animal health.  
 
It is argued that in addition, the GMO Act fails to deal with the standard of liability, that 
is to say whether it is strict liability, fault based or a combination of both.
383
 The 
questions of redress is inadequately addressed in that there is no indication of what 
measures are to be taken for mitigation, control or containment despite the fact that these 
                                                 
376
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are basic requirements for redress regimes.
384
 Furthermore, the Act does not make 







 NEMA provisions on duty of care and emergency incidents are 
relevant to the GMOs particularly in the context of damage resulting from their use and 
release. These provisions place liability on persons responsible for the damage and these 
may include the producer of a GMO, hence, providing an arguably more just liability 
regime. Although the NEMA provisions are welcome, it would be preferable to have 
such provisions included in the GMO Act, and not in a different piece of legislation. It is 
noted with merit that the Amendment Bill attempts to improve on the liability regime 
where it makes small amendments. The Bill appears to extend the scope of damage from 
the environment to human and animal health.
387
 This is undoubtedly very important 
because ultimately the concern is for safety of human beings. 
 
5.5 Decision-making 
With respect to decision-making, the GMO Act is inadequate in a number of ways. First, 
the Act fails to make provision for guidance in decision-making.
388
 This is apparent in its 
failure to adopt guidelines on the application of the precautionary principle, risk 
assessments, environmental impact assessments as well as socio-economic impact 
assessments.
389
   
 
The precautionary principle, endorsed by the Biosafety Protocol in the context of 
biosafety, is ‘bastardised’ under the GMO Act.
390
 The GMO Act provides that: 
 






 Section 4.2.1 See section 28 and 30 of NEMA. 
387
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388
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‘Lack of scientific knowledge or consensus on the use of genetically modified organisms shall not 




This provision effectively renders its application nugatory as lack of scientific knowledge 
or consensus on the safe use of GMOs is deemed irrelevant and will not be taken into 
account in decision-making.
392
 This position is rather contradictory on the part of the 
Government because the National Environmental Management Policy expressly states 




The Amendment Bill does not adequately address the issues surrounding decision-
making, which remains problematic and excludes the Biosafety Protocol’s precautionary 
principle.
394
 As noted earlier, the Amendment Bill unfortunately rather introduces the 
WTO terminology of ‘science based risk assessment’.
395
 As noted previously, the GMO 
Act fails to prescribe mandatory requirements for important decision-making tools such 
as EIAs, risk assessments and socio-economic impact assessments. This further 
compounds the issue of decision-making. 
 
5.6 Public Participation  
The GMO Act does not make adequate provision for public participation. Public 
participation is scarcely provided for under the Regulations. Applicants are required to 
notify the public of proposed releases of GMOs prior to their application for permits.
396
 
The notice is to be published in a local newspaper in the area in which the proposed 
release is to take place.
397
 This is problematic as such notice would not be accessible to 
potential interested members of the public in other areas. Another problem relates to the 
contents of the notice to be published that are rather inadequate for the public to make 
any meaningful comments.
398
 Information such as risk assessments and EIAs would 
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particularly aid the public in making meaningful comments. The 30 days period within 
which the public is expected to respond is insufficient and impractical for any meaningful 
comments to be made. Worse still, the regulatory institutions such as the Advisory 
Committee exclude any kind of civil society participation.
399
 This is a serious 
shortcoming as it is inconsistent with the basic tenets of democracy and the principles of 
environmental governance.
400
 It is further inconsistent with the NEM principles, one of 




Consequently, in instances where permits are not required, public participation does not 
take place. Since GMOs dealt with under ‘contained use’ are exempt from permit 
requirements, these activities take place without any form of public participation. It is 
argued by some commentators that the intention of the GMO Act appears to be to prevent 
the public from getting any information on the potential risks of GMOs to human and 
animal health, and the environment.
402
 The provisions of PAJA overcome some these 
inadequacies.
403
 They make provision for adequate notice of the nature and purpose of a 
proposed administrative action, reasonable opportunity to make representations among 
others.  
 
5.7 Labelling Requirements 
Labelling of genetically modified foods is an important tool for providing information to 
the public and a mechanism that to manage risks.
404
 As an information tool, labelling 
sustains the consumer’s right to know what he is purchasing or using. As a tool for risk 
management, users are able to get information from labels concerning the GMOs, GM’s 
toxicity, allergen and environmental safety.
405
 Accordingly, end-users can use this 
information to take remedial measures to contain any risks pursuant to the information 
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contained in the labels.
406
 Segregation is important especially during processing and 
storage as it prevents contamination of organic foods by GM foods.
407
  
GMO products, such as foodstuffs, fall outside the ambit of the GMO Act. There is 
currently no mandatory labelling requirements for GM foods in South Africa whether 
locally produced or imported.
408
 There is also no requirement for segregating GM foods 
from non-GM foods.
409
 Food safety assessments are not included in the GMO Act. The 
underlying rationale for this appears to be that labeling and segregation are very 





In the absence of labelling requirements and provisions on food safety in the GMO Act 
and its Regulations, the provisions of the FCD Act have to be invoked. The FDC Act is 
meant to safe guard consumers from harmful foodstuffs.  The Act and its Regulations
411
 
provide for the labeling of foodstuffs derived from certain techniques of genetic 
modification. Labelling is only required where the composition or the nutritional value of 
the food differs significantly from the characteristic composition of that foodstuff in its 
non-modified form.
412
 The Regulations define ‘significant difference’ to exist only where 
characteristics are different in terms of a scientific assessment of an appropriate analysis 
of data.
413
 It is argued that this provision is altogether not realistic especially since it 
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5.8 Confidentiality and Access to Information 
The GMO Act contains provisions on confidentiality,
415
 which arguably limit the 
constitutional right of access to information. The Act prescribes that applicants may 
request certain information be treated as confidential or undisclosed where they perceive 
it to be necessary. What is concerning is the fact that these provisions allow the Council 
to decide what kind of information should be kept confidential after consultation with the 
applicant.
416
 This gives the Council a lot of discretion to determine what information to 
keep confidential, a discretion not guided by any guidelines. The Council having 
consulted with the applicant may withhold further information in the interest of 
protecting the applicants’ intellectual property rights.
417
 This appears to be an attempt to 
keep certain vital information about the potential risks of GMOs away from the public 




The Amendment Bill fails to remedy the provisions on confidential information and 
access to information. Instead, it appears to narrow down the scope of information that 
may be disclosed. The description of the GMO is reduced to ‘general’ description.
419
  
Clearly, less information will be disclosed under a general description. In addition, the 
‘evaluation of foreseeable impacts’ has been reduced to a ‘summary of the ‘scientifically 
based risk assessment’.
420
 The introduction of the latter concept will inevitably restrict 
access to information as other foreseeable impacts socio-economic for instance will not 
be included. The impact of all this will restrict the enjoyment of the right of access to 
information and consequently hamper public participation.
 421
 The NEMA provisions on 
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5.9 Administrative Justice Provisions 
The GMO Act and its Regulations contain provisions that are inconsistent with 
administrative justice provisions. The Constitution guarantees the right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and fair.
423
 PAJA further reaffirms this right. Although 
PAJA does not expressly define what amounts to a fair administrative process, it does 
charge an administrator to put into effect certain minimum guarantees for the benefit of 
the affected person. These include; adequate notice of the proposed administrative action; 
a reasonable opportunity to make representations; a clear statement of administrative 
action; adequate notice of right of review and adequate notice of the right to request 
reason.
424
 Under PAJA, ‘administrative action’ includes any decision taken in the 
exercise of public power.
 425
 The authorization of permits under the GMO Act clearly 
constitutes administrative action. 
 
The GMO Act and its Regulations are inconsistent with PAJA in various respects. First, 
they do not guarantee the right to reasons. Under the Act, this right is only available 
where an application has been turned down.
426
 It is submitted that reasons are still 
imperative even when a permit has been granted, as this will enable members of the 
public opposed to an approval to challenge the decision. However, the public could 




 Secondly, according to PAJA
428
 and its relevant regulations
429
 in order to give effect to 
the right to procedural fairness, an administrator must give the public notice of the nature 
and purpose of a proposed administrative action. The GMO Act and its regulations 
appear to fall short of these requirements.
430
 Neither the Council nor the Registrar is 
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Regulation 6 of the GMO Regulations, which appears to address the issue of notification, 
is inadequate as it only relates to the release of GMOs and no other activities for which 
permits are granted.
432
 Although PAJA calls for a ‘reasonable notice’ to be given such 
that the public can make meaningful comments,
433
 regulation 6 of the GMO Regulations 
provides a comment period of only 30 days, a period that is generally considered 
insufficient. In the Biowatch case,
434
 the High Court held the view that the notice 
reflected under regulation 6(3) is inadequate for purpose of informing the public and 






The GMO Act and its Regulations do make provision for appeals.
436
 One of the 
shortcomings of the appeal provisions is the reference to ‘appellant’ in the Regulations. 
This gives the impression that only applicants under the GMO Act would have recourse 
to appeal.
437
 This is clearly not the case since the Act expressly states that ‘any person’ 
who feels aggrieved by a decision, not just the applicants.
438
 Hence, even non-applicants 
who are aggrieved by the decisions of the Council may appeal.  
 
A further concern with the appeals provision is the fact that there is no requirement for 
notification of the public when a decision has been made. This is problematic as onus lies 
on the public to establish when the appellant has been notified of the decision in order to 
lodge an appeal timeously.
439
 This problem is compounded by the fact that according to 
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the Regulations, the appeal must be lodged within 30 days of the decision and there is no 




5.11 Fast Track Mechanism 
This mechanism operates through the stewardship of the main administrative organ of the 
GMO Act, the Registrar. The Act empowers the Registrar to ‘fast track’ any application 
for an activity concerning GMOs for which a permit has previously been granted.
441
 In 
practice, this means that where a permit has previously been granted for an import of a 
particular GMO, GM maize for instance, subsequent imports of that maize may be 
approved without further risk assessments being done. 
 
The fast track mechanism is problematic in that it gives the Registrar too much discretion 
to determine whether to request a further risk assessment. The result is that risk 
assessments may be by-passed if the Registrar deems this appropriate.  It is submitted 
that further risk assessments may reveal new impacts and so the idea of the ‘fast track’ 
mechanism is altogether deplorable. Besides, a precautionary approach would not 
advocate such a mechanism given then there is so much uncertainty surrounding GMOs. 
 
5.12 Enforcement and Compliance mechanisms 
The GMO Act has very weak provisions on enforcement and compliance, which relies 
heavily on self-regulation.
442
 There is no provision that calls for monitoring of 
compliance with permitting conditions.
443
 Permit holders are supposed to monitor there 
own compliance.
444
 There are provisions for inspectors who are supposed to carry out 
routine inspections on compliance with the Act and permit conditions.
445
 However, it is 
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In risk management, risks are identified and regulated with the sole purpose of reducing 
them.
447
 It is pertinent that all safety legislation provide for risk management measures 
that will ensure that monitoring of the activity continues even after the approval has been 
granted.
448
 The GMO Act does not make it the responsibility of the applicant to take any 
such measures.
449
  Neither is such measures provided for. The Amendment Bill does not 
attempt to remedy the situation. NEMA’s duty of care provisions partly overcome this 
problem in that it prescribes reasonable measures that may be taken in case of pollution 




Although the GMO Act has is criticized for its self-regulatory approach and the general 
inadequacies associated with its compliance and enforcement mechanism, the 
Amendment Bill tries to address certain of these inadequacies. The Bill empowers the 
Registrar to amend or withdraw a permit subject to instructions and conditions laid down 
by the Council.
451
 This is very important because applicants, or the grantees of permits, 
will be motivated to work within the limits prescribed under the conditions. However, a 
problem remains with the fact that, the Council has the discretion to determine when to 
instruct the Registrar to amend or withdraw a permit.  
 
5.13 Unintentional Release and Emergency Measures 
GMOs are potentially hazardous substances. Therefore, it is preferable to have requisite 
measures and plans for when emergencies occur. The GMO Regulations attempt to 
provide for unintentional release and emergency measures although in a piecemeal 
fashion. The user is obligated to inform the Registrar both verbally and in writing should 
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 Section 28.3 NEMA.  
451




an accident involving GMOs occur.
452
 An ‘accident’ is defined to mean ‘any incident 
involving an unintended general release of genetically modified organisms which could 
have an immediate or delayed impact on the environment’.
453
 The problem is that 
accidents are made entirely the responsibility of the user.
454
 The responsibility in case of 
accidents ought to be placed on the producers as well since they are more knowledgeable 
about GMOs.  
 
These provisions are rather scanty and they do not indicate the type of measures that 
should be taken by the users. Similarly, no provision is made for public notification as 
such the public would not know when and what remedial measures to take incase of an 
emergency involving GMOs.
455
 NEMA’s provisions on control of emergencies may be 
applied in case of emergencies resulting from the use of GMOs as earlier noted.
456
 These 
are more comprehensive than the provisions set out in the Regulations.  
 
5.14 Prohibition of Activities 
The power to prohibit GMO related activities is acknowledged as a very crucial element 
of any biosafety regime. The GMO Act empowers the Minister to prohibit activities 
involving GMO on recommendation of the Council.
457
 What is lacking, however, is the 
power to prohibit certain GMOs, GM products or GM related activities. It is argued that 
such power is vital because some GMOs may display traits that are hazardous enough to 




5.15 Inconsistency with Other Laws 
There is enormous inconsistency and a lack of integration between the GMO Act and its 
Regulations, and other laws such as the PAJA, NEMA, PAIA and NEMBA as underlined 
earlier. NEMBA provides that, the Minister can deny the granting of a permit for a 
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genetically modified organism, if  in their opinion, the release of such organism into the 
environment will pose a threat to indigenous species or the environment unless a prior 
EIA has been conducted.
459
 The concern with this provision is that it appears to be 
impracticable as there is no mechanism to coordinate the NEMBA and the GMO Act.
460
 
As such, it is doubtful whether the Council under the GMO Act gives the Minister an 




The NEMA EIA regulations
462
 list the release of genetically modified organisms as one 
of the activities that require screening before the issue of environmental authorization. 
However, this is applicable only where the GMO Act or the NEMBA requires assessment. 






Biosafety regulation in South Africa is not a new phenomenon. In 1997, South Africa 
enacted its domestic biosafety legislation the GMO Act of 1997. This Act and its 
Regulations are very problematic to say the least and are generally inconsistent with 
standards prescribed in international instruments such as the Biosafety Protocol and the 
African Model Law. The inconsistency of the current regime with international standards 
may be attributed to the fact that its enactment preceded the prescription of these 
standards However, what is noteworthy, is that, recent legislative amendments fail to 
remedy the current inconsistency. The Amendment Bill fails to remedy issues such as; 
the lack of a liability and redress regime; labeling; and the application of the 
precautionary principle. While the Biosafety Protocol is not clear on these issues, the 
African Model Law, attempts to provide comprehensive provisions that South Africa 
could have adopted. The South Africa’s biosafety regime therefore, remains largely 
inadequate for biosafety purposes and inconsistent with international standards.  
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AN OVERVIEW OF UGANDA’S BIOSAFETY REGIME 
6.1 Introduction  
The prescription of a biosafety regulatory framework for biosafety in Uganda is a recent 
phenomenon. According to Akol,
464
 the current Ugandan regime comprises the following; 
the National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy;
465
 the National Biosafety Guidelines
466
 
and the Draft Biosafety Regulations.
467
 Other relevant documents include the Manual on 
the Protection of Confidential Business Information in Uganda and the Manual on 
Transboundary Movement of GMOs in Uganda.  
 
Like its East African counterparts, Uganda has an interim biosafety regulatory system.
468
 
Although Uganda does not have an Act designated for biosafety regulation, the 
Government has drafted a Biosafety Bill. It is however yet to be enacted into law. The 
following discussion of Uganda’s biosafety regulatory framework will focus mainly on 
the Draft Biosafety Regulations, which represents the current regime, and the Biosafety 
Bill, which represents the future regime. The Draft Biosafety Regulations and the 
Biosafety Bill will be analysed to determine whether they provide an adequate regime for 
protection of humans and the environment in the context of biosafety. 
 
6.2 Principal Legislation 
 
6.2.1 Draft National Biosafety Regulations  
The Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) is the competent 
authority for purposes of implementing the Biosafety Protocol.
469
 This institution, which 
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was established under the UNCST Statute,
470
 is in charge of regulating genetic 
engineering and other biotechnologies.
471
 The Draft National Biosafety Regulations 
(hereinafter Draft Biosafety Regulations) were passed under the patronage of the UNCST 
Statute. Commenting on the Draft Biosafety Regulations in 2004, Mayet stated that they 
appeared to be in their infancy.
472
 Almost three years later, the Regulations still appear to 
be in draft form. The Draft Biosafety Regulations aim to ensure that in the use of GMOs, 




The Draft Biosafety Regulations define key terms such as ‘contained use’, ‘genetically 
modified organism’ and ‘modern Biotechnology’.
474
 They adopt the definition of these 
terms in the Protocol. The scope of the Draft Biosafety Regulations covers the 
‘generation, import, export, contained use, release or placing on the market of any 
genetically modified organism or their ‘living products’.
475
 Pharmaceuticals and a range 
of other GMOs are excluded from the Regulations.
476
 Mayet rightly observes that the 




With respect to institutions, the Draft Biosafety Regulations establish three institutions, 
namely; the National Focal Point (NFP), the Competent Authority (CA) and the National 
Biosafety Committee (NBC).
478
 Provision is also made for the establishment of 
Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs).
479
 The Regulations name the Ministry of 
Lands, Water and Environment as the National Focal Point.
480
 The UNSCT is designated 
as the CA
481
 and it is charged with the duty to establish a NBC that must be 
representative of the government, nongovernmental organizations as well as the private 
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 Persons interested in carrying out GMO related activities including contained 




The Regulations make provision for public awareness and participation
484
 and the 
application of the precautionary principle when taking decisions.
485
 Provision is made for 
review of decisions, risk assessment and risk management.
486
 There is a requirement for 
clear labelling and identification and a confidentiality clause.
487
 A liability and redress 




6.2.2 Uganda Biosafety Bill 
The Uganda Biosafety Bill
489
 (hereinafter Biosafety Bill) was drafted in 2005 and 
published in October of the same year.
490
 The purpose of the Biosafety Bill include; 
establishing an institutional framework for regulation of GMO activities; establishing risk 
assessment and management standards; providing for public participation and access to 
information; and establishing a liability and redress regime.
491
 The Draft Biosafety 
Regulations were enacted under the UNCST statute as earlier noted. Consequently, when 
the Biosafety Bill is enacted into law, these Regulations will not complement it. Rather, 
new Regulations will be enacted to facilitate the implementation of the Biosafety Bill 




The Biosafety Bill has a broad scope of application, which encompasses; imports; exports; 
research; contained use; development; release or placing on the market of any GMO or 
product thereof, for use as pharmaceuticals, FFP.
493
  In part II, It establishes three 
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institutions namely; the NFP, the National Competent Authority (NCA); and the NBC
494
 
and sets out their functions.
495
 The Biosafety Bill prescribes an application and approval 
procedure for authorization to undertake any activity under the Bill.
496
 The Biosafety Bill 
makes provision for public awareness, participation and access to information.
497
 There is 
provision for appeals and reviews of decisions.
498
 Exemptions and simplified approval 
procedure under which certain GMOs may be exempted from authorization and others 
subject to simplified information requirements are contained in the Bill.
499
 The Biosafety 
Bill makes provision for a confidentiality clause, and includes identification and labeling 
provisions.
500
 Finally, the Bill makes provision for; risk assessment and management;
501
 a 
liability and redress regime;
502





 The Bill contains four Annexes, which provide for; information 
required in applications under section 14; additional information required in case of 
placing on the market; general principles and specific requirements for risk assessment 




6.3 Relevant Policy 
 
6.3.1 The National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy 
The National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy (National Policy) contains the vision of 
the Ugandan Government for Uganda concerning biotechnology. The vision is ‘to make 
Uganda a country fully and safely utilizing biotechnology in national development’.
506
 
The Government of Uganda undertakes to promote and facilitate safe development and 
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sustainable application of biotechnology.
507
 The Government of Uganda seeks to achieve 
the following under its National Policy: build and strengthen national capacity in 
biotechnology through research and development; promote the utilization of biotech 
living products and processes as tools for national development; and provide a regulatory 
and institutional framework for biotechnology development and applications. In addition, 
ensure public and environmental safety in biotechnology development and application; 
determine measures for risk assessment and management for all biotechnological 
applications; and provide for measures for biotechnology and biosafety monitoring and 
evaluation.
508
   
 
The National Policy contains policy statements and action plans regarding every area 
identified in its objectives. Regarding legal and regulatory framework, the Government 
seeks to put in place requisite legal and regulatory regime that will balance promotional 




6.3.2 The Guidelines for Biosafety in Biotechnology for Uganda 
The National Biosafety Guidelines were drafted under section 3 (a) of the Uganda 
National Council for Science and Technology Statute No 1 of 1990. The objectives of the 
Guidelines include; ensuring public and environmental safety in research and 
development (R&D) and industrial applications; determining the measure for risk 
assessment and evaluation in GMO related activities; and promoting opportunities for the 
application and exploitation of biotechnology.
510
 The Guidelines provide procedure for 
risk assessment and risk management measures;
511
 procedure for release and 
commercialization of rDNA organisms;
512
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CRITIQUE OF UGANDA’S BIOSAFETY REGIME 
 
7.1 Scope and Exclusions 
The scope of the Draft Biosafety Regulations cover generation, import, export, contained 
use, release or placing on the market of GMOs or GMO living products as stated 
earlier.
514
 Non-living products of GMOs, such as foodstuffs, are therefore excluded from 
the ambit of the Regulations. As pointed out earlier, non-living products of GMOs are 
equally potentially hazardous as their living counterparts and hence require regulation.
515
 
Therefore, this provision is rendered inadequate, as it would not effectively protect 
human being and the environment from potential harm likely to be caused by non-living 
GMO products.  
 
Fortunately, however, the Biosafety Bill has a wider scope of application, which is all-
inclusive.
516
 Its scope extends to all activities mentioned under the Draft Biosafety 
Regulations
517
 and to products of GMOs whether intended for; release into the 
environment, use as pharmaceuticals; or FFP. In addition, the Biosafety Bill applies to the 
development of GMOs.
518
 Although the provision does not expressly mention the 
inclusion of non-living products of GMOs, the inclusion of pharmaceuticals which are 
clearly non-living products implies that these are included.  
 
The Biosafety Bill’s comprehensive coverage of GMOs is commendable. Such a 
provision is welcome as it adopts the approach that, in order to take precautionary 
measures, all GMOs, their products and related activities must be subject to regulation.
519
 
It is hoped therefore that when the Bill is enacted into law, it will afford the requisite 
safety required for the application of biotechnology in Uganda  
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7.2 Institutional Arrangements 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations contain ineffective provisions on institutional 
arrangement. The Draft Biosafety Regulations establish the NFC, CA and NBC as stated 
earlier.
520
 The NFC and the CA serve as the contact with the CBD, and supervise, and 
control the implementation of the Act, respectively.
521
 The NBC is to be established by 
the CA and it is required to have representation from the government, NGOs and the 
private sector.
522
  However, a major omission is that, duties and roles of the NBC are not 
prescribed. Consequently, it is not clear what role they play in the decision-making 
process.
523
 Where such roles are not outlined, it becomes difficult to determine whether 
there is transparency or not.  
 
Further, the inclusion of the private sector in the NBC is questionable as members of this 
sector may include persons from the biotechnology industry.
524
 These persons cannot be 
in position to make impartial decisions, as they have interests in the promotion of the 
industry. The NBC is required to draw its own rules of procedure.
525
 This is not advisable 
as it is doubtful whether they would make rigorous rules of procedure particularly where 




The Biosafety  Bill on the other hand, contains provisions with respect to institutions that 
are more effective. It establishes a number of institutions whose powers and roles are 
clearly prescribed. These as noted previously are the NFP, NCA and NBC.
527
 Two 
aspects are noteworthy regarding these institutions. First, numerous obligations are 
imposed on these bodies. They are not simply endowed with discretionary powers and 
functions such as considering applications and decision-making.
528
 One of the most 
important obligations is that imposed on the NCA to promote awareness, participation 
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and education on matters related to biosafety, including decision-making.
529
 Although the 
details of how this is to be achieved are not set out, it is submitted that this provision 
should contribute towards ensuring effective public participation.  
 
Another element worth noting is the composition of the NBC, a body that will play an 
advisory role to the NCA.
530
 The NBC comprises of fifteen members who are 
representative of key stakeholders including; Government Agencies; the private sector; 
academic institutions; and civil society.
531
 The NBC will therefore have a 
multidisciplinary representation, necessary when dealing with the complexities of 
GMOs.
532
 These provisions are largely based on those set out in the African Model Law, 
which is very elaborate in this respect.
533
 The composition of the other institutions is 
unfortunately not prescribed.   
 
Effective provisions on institutional arrangement are very important because, the 
institutions implement provisions of biosafety laws. As such, it is imperative that their 
powers and duties are well set out. This will arguably facilitate their efficiency and in 
turn promote adequate protection. 
 
7.3 Application and Approval Procedures  
Arguably, the Biosafety Bill contains precise provisions relating to applications and 
approval procedures. The Biosafety Bill states clearly that persons who wish to carry out 
a GMO or GMO product related activities require written authorization, obtainable 
following a written application.
534
 The Bill also specifies additional information which 
applicants are required to submit including comprehensive risk assessment, information 
on previous approvals and rejections.
535
 The Information included in applications appears 
to be comprehensive and should arguably provide decision-makers with sufficient detail 
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to facilitate reasoned decision-making. The provisions of the Draft Biosafety Regulations 
governing applications and approval are worth noting as they state the type of 
information required from the applicant.
536
 However it is noted that the regulations only 
refer to an ‘assessment’ report.
537
 It does not specify whether it is a risk assessment or 
EIA which is required. It is submitted that such a provision is not workable. There is need 
for clarity in this respect such that applicants are fairly well informed about what is 
required of them during the application process. 
 
7.4 Decision-making Procedure 
A number of weaknesses are noted under the decision-making provisions of the Draft 
Biosafety Regulations and the Biosafety Bill. Under the Regulations, the CA is obliged to 
comply with the National Biosafety Guidelines when examining an application prior to 
an approval.
538
 While the Guidelines set out in some detail the risk assessment procedure 
to be followed, the decision-making procedure are regarded as problematic as the CA is 
the sole decision making body.
539
 Worse still, the composition of this body is 
unknown.
540
 The Regulations only state that the UNCST is designated as the CA but do 
not specify its composition.
541
 The CA should preferably be assisted by an independent 




The Bill does not explicitly set down under its decision-making provisions what 
considerations must be taken into account in arriving at a decision.
543
 Neither does it state 
whether the opinion of the public obtained through the public participation process will 
be taken into consideration. However, as will be noted in other sections of the Bill, risk 
assessment, provision for public input and the precautionary principle are all provided for 
and these aid in the decision making process.
544
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Notwithstanding the above stated, there are some good points worth noting concerning 
decision-making under the Draft Biosafety Regulation and the Biosafety Bill. The 
provisions of the Draft Regulations appear to be fairly well defined in the sense that they 
set out considerations based on which decisions will be made.
545
  These include; the 
precautionary principle; socio-economic impacts and risk assessments, which are all set 
out in separate sections.
546
 The Bill on the other hand, categorically stipulates under its 
risk assessments provisions that the NCA shall base its decisions on the precautionary 
principle, risk assessment and the advice of the NBC.
547
 Generally the provisions in 
question under both the Draft Regulations and the Biosafety Bill are submitted to be 
weak and inadequate. 
 
7.5 Review of Decisions 
Both the Regulations and the Biosafety Bill provide for the review of decisions.
548
 This 
power to review is essential because circumstances may change, and further risks to 
human health and the environment may become known over time.
549
 Therefore, if new 
information or a review of existing information point toward further risks to the 
environment, biological diversity or socio-economic conditions, an approval may be 
withdrawn or subjected to additional conditions.
550
 This is submitted to be one of the 
strengths of the biosafety regime. 
 
7.6 Public Awareness and Participation 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations contain inadequate and ineffective provisions on public 
participation. The Draft Biosafety Regulations appear to mix up several related issues 
such as access to information, public participation by way of comment, and 
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 In addition, the public participation procedures are found to be 
inadequate in several respects. First, the Draft Regulations do not clearly specify the right 
to participate in the consultation process. Rather the discretion is given to the CA to 
determine when the public will be consulted.
552
 Secondly, the period within which the 
public is expected to furnish their comments is not prescribed and the discretion appears 
to be left with the CA to decide.
553
  Notwithstanding any benefits associated with this 
approach, it is advisable that a standard period for comment is prescribed in the 
Regulations and the CA granted the discretion to extend the period under special cases. 
The need for clear provisions on public participation in environmental governance 
generally and in biosafety regulation in particular cannot be overstated.  
 
The public participation provisions in the Biosafety Bill appear largely adequate. The 
Biosafety Bill guarantees the right of access to information,
554
 which is a very important 
tool, as this will enable the public to access relevant information. Public consultation is 
provided for, which guarantees the right to participate and the period for consultation is 
determined by the NCA on a discretionary basis.
555
 The discretion to determine the time 
needed for consultation is important because some applications will require more time 
than others will. In any case, it is guaranteed that enough time will be given for such 
process before a decision is made.  
  
These public participation provisions are largely based on the African Model Law, which 
draws from Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration. Principle 10, distinctly states three pillars 
of public participation, namely the right to information, the right to participate in 
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7.7 Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
The Draft Biosafety Regulation provides for risk assessment in terms that are rather 
ambiguous.
557
 A risk assessment is required before GMO related activities including 
importation, contained use, release or placing on the market can be authorized, and, the 
applicant or the CA may carry out this assessment ‘as appropriate’.
558
 The CA may 
require the applicant to bear the costs for evaluating the risk assessment or carrying out 
the risk assessment.
559
 Risk assessment must be done in accordance with the National 
Biosafety Guidelines. 
 
These provisions are found to be inadequate for a number of reasons. First, there appears 
to be confusion between the risk assessment, which is the obligation of the applicant, and 
that, which is the responsibility of the CA.
560
 Preferably, the applicant must conduct a 
risk assessment, and where the need arises for verification, the CA may authorise another 
assessment and request the applicant to bear the costs. The Regulations state that the 
applicant or CA shall conduct risk assessment as appropriate, however, ‘as appropriate’ is 
subject to interpretation and there is no indication of who determines it or how it would 
be determined. Further, there is no indication of the scope of the risk to be investigated, 
that is whether it is risk to human and animal health, or the environment or both. The 
Regulations also make provision for exemption of risk assessment. The CA, where it is 
satisfied that the GMO will not cause any risk to the environment or human health may 
not require risk assessment.
561
 It is very unlikely that a GMO can be considered not risky  




Although earlier, it was stated that the Draft Biosafety Regulations contains vague risk 
assessment provisions; these however, have certain merits. For instance, the fact that 
assessment is to be guided by the National Biosafety Guidelines. The Guidelines set out 
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detailed procedures for risk assessment and risk management, which should ensure 
uniformity and clarity.  
 
The risk assessment provisions under the Biosafety Bill are arguably adequate. Risk 
assessments must be undertaken for all GMO related activities except as noted previously, 
in the unfortunate case when the NCA and NBC decide otherwise.
563
 The scope of the 
risk assessment is wide and it includes consideration of impact GMO related activity on 
human health, biological diversity, the environment, socio-economic conditions and 
cultural values.
564
 The Bill requires any persons with a stake in the process, or where 
their participation is likely to cause a conflict of interest, should not engage in evaluation 
of risk assessment.
565
 Where an independent risk assessment cannot be done or where the 





Although the Biosafety Bill contains arguably adequate risk assessment provisions, one 
major weakness is noted. The relevant section commences as follows; ‘Except as 
provided for in this Act or as the NCA in consultation with the NBC may decide, no 
GMO or product of GMO activity will take place without assessment of the impact and 
the risks posed…’
567
 Undertaking risk assessments therefore, appears to be discretionary 
in certain circumstances. Under the exemption procedure, the NCA and the NBC may 
exempt certain GMOs or their products from authorization.
568
 It is presumed that this is 
one of circumstances when the NCA and NBC would exercise their discretion to bypass 
risk assessment. It is submitted, however, that the idea of bypassing a risk assessment is 
not desirable given the uncertainty surrounding GMOs.  
  
As far as risk management is concerned, the NCA is empowered to request any person 
responsible for any GMO related activity to take measures necessary to prevent and limit 
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any damage to human or animal health, biological diversity or the environment.
569
 The 
responsible person may also have to restore the environment to its original state as far as 
it is feasible if requested to do so by the NCA.
570
 Moreover, the Bill enumerates the 
measures that the responsible persons should take. Notable among these is the duty to 





7.8 Confidentiality and Access to information 
Both the Draft Biosafety Regulations and the Biosafety Bill contain provisions on 
confidentiality that restrict access to information. The Draft Biosafety Regulations make 
provision for the protection of confidential business information.
572
 The CA determines 
what amounts to confidential information after an applicant makes a claim for 
confidentiality. Certain information is however, not afforded such protection and includes; 
the description of the GMO, methods and plans of monitoring, and the evaluation of 
foreseeable effects.
573
 The CA may trump the confidentiality clause and disclose 




Regulation 12.2 of the Draft Biosafety Regulations specifically stating information that 
must be disclosed is based on Article 21.6 of the Biosafety Protocol. This is problematic 
as the Biosafety Protocol sets the minimum standard. Domestic regulation should not 
restrict the accessible information to the content of Article 21.6 of the Protocol.
575
  This is 
because, when the right of access to information by the public is restricted, it hinders any 
meaningful participation by the public.
576
 Additionally, it appears the CA is given a great 
deal discretion in determining what information should be protected.  
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The Biosafety Bill provisions for confidentiality appear to follow the trend of the Draft 
Biosafety Regulations, which is rather restrictive.
577
 While the NCA in consultation with 
the applicant determine what information will be protected, only limited information as 
indicated in the Draft Biosafety Regulations is made accessible.
578
 This effectively means 
that a great deal of information will be kept away from interested parties such as 
members of the public.    
 
These provisions are submitted to be ineffective and unworkable mainly because they 
restrict access to information. This inevitably adversely affects the public participation 
process, which as pointed out earlier is very vital in environmental protection.  
 
7.9 Exemptions and Fast –Track Procedure 
The Biosafety Bill provides for exemptions and a simplified approval Procedure.
579
 The 
NCA, in consultation with the NBC, is empowered to exempt certain GMOs from 
authorization.
580
 Further, the NCA must maintain a list of GMOs or products that are 
exempt from authorization. It is submitted that such provisions could defeat the purpose 
of biosafety regulation. In addition, such an approach is not precautionary, as it does not 
subject all GMOs or their products to risk assessment. It is unclear whether exempted 
GMOs will be subject to any form of risk or impact assessment.  
 
The Biosafety Bill provides for simplified approval procedures to be applied by the NCA 
in consultation with the NBC where it determines that sufficient scientific knowledge is 
available for risk management.
581
 It is submitted that, it is highly unlikely that sufficient 
information on a GMO can be obtained to warrant simplified procedures, there is simply 
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7.10 Unintentional Release and Emergency Measures 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations and the Biosafety Bill make express provision for 
unintentional release and emergencies. These provisions are arguably adequate. The CA, 
under the Draft Biosafety Regulations, must ensure that the applicant has drawn up an 
emergency plan before any approval is made.
583
 Additionally, the CA must ensure that 
the applicant furnishes persons likely to be affected by any accidents with information on 
necessary safety measures.
584
  Under the Biosafety Bill, the NCA must develop, maintain 
and use an accident containment strategy to human health, biological diversity and the 
environment in case of accidents resulting from genetic engineering or use of GMOs or 
their products.
585
 If these provisions are implemented, containing emergencies resulting 
from GMO activity will arguably be made easier and hopefully less damage would be 
expected when these occur. 
 
7.11 Liability and Redress Regime 
The liability and redress provisions in the Biosafety Bill are arguably comprehensive and 
just.
586
 It attempts to capture all the essential relevant elements of a liability regime 
identified to include; standard of proof; nature of redress; and insurance and/or financial 
security.
587
 Notably, liability under the Bill extends to the supplier and developer in 
addition to the person responsible for the activity and the standard of liability provided 
for is strict.
588
 The extension of liability to suppliers and developers is undoubtedly just 
considering that these often have the financial capacity to compensate for damages 
caused. With regard to the strict standard of proof, this will generally motivate persons 
dealing with GAO’s to be extremely precautious   
 
Also worth noting, is the fact the Bill grants legal standing to private persons, or group of 
persons, who want to seek redress for breach or threatened breach relating to the 
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environment, biological diversity, human health or socio-economic conditions.
589
 Where 
these persons do not succeed in an action brought in public interest, they are exonerated 
from paying costs.
590
 This should encourage public interest litigation relating to biosafety 
regulation and environmental protection.  
 
7.12 Labelling and Identification 
The labeling and identification provisions contained in the Biosafety Bill appear to be 
satisfactory. A comprehensive labelling and identification/traceability system is one of 
key features of a biosafety law.
591
 The Bill provides that GMOs and their products must 
be clearly identified and labeled as GMOs.
592
 This identification should include relevant 
traits and characteristics given with sufficient detail to enable traceability and facilitate 
verification.
593
 The threshold for a consignment to be considered a GMO is set at 
1.0%.
594
 This threshold is relatively low and will ensure that consignments with the 
slightest trait of GMOs are labelled, hence protecting consumers health and choice. In 
addition, a GMO, products of GMOs or consignment of GMOs or products of GMOs 
must state any known allergies, reactions or side effects.
595
 This will clearly provide users 
with relevant information hence rendering better protection.  The Bill requires exporters 
to segregate GMOs or GMO related products from non-GMO products during their 
handling and transportation which is very important in order to prevent contamination.
596
 
These provisions generally appear to be workable. 
 
7.13 Offences and Penalties 
In the implementation and enforcement of environmental law, criminal sanctions are 
noted as one of the key tools.
597
 The Ugandan regulatory system sets out a rather 
comprehensive section on offences and penalties. What is remarkable is the wide range of 
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acts that are criminalised and the severe nature of penalties prescribed under the 
Biosafety Bill.
598
 A person convicted of an offence under the Biosafety Bill will be liable 
to a fine or imprisonment of not less than five years but not exceeding ten years or both. 
It is submitted that harsh sentences are necessary, as this will motivate persons dealing 
with GMOs to take extra caution in ensuring compliance with the law. This should 
subsequently ensure greater safety and protection of human, animal, and plant health and 
the environment.    
 
Acts that are regarded as offences include: importing GMOs or their products without 
permission; violating conditions attached to an approval; failure to label and package 
GMOs or their products in accordance to the law; and using labeling and packaging that 
is false, misleading or deceptive. 
599
 These above provisions are commendable in this 
respect but it is hoped that they will not be undermined by resource constraints when it 
comes to compliance and enforcement 
 
7.14 Compliance and Enforcement 
The Biosafety Bill contains satisfactory provisions on compliance and enforcement. The 
NCA is charged with the duty of designating inspectors.
600
 Although the details of their 
qualifications are not set out, it is assumed that they will be trained to carry out their 
duties. An inspector will bear a certificate, which will distinguish them from possible 
impostors.  The powers given to the inspectors are very broad and include the power to 
enter onto premises, seize items and to issue directives.
601
 While these provisions are 
praiseworthy, unless Uganda allocates resources and capacity towards compliance and 
enforcement, which are currently constrained, these provisions may be undermined. 
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7.15 Legal Authority 
It appears that biosafety regulation in Uganda does not have adequate legal authority. The 
Biosafety Bill has not yet been enacted into law. The Draft Biosafety Regulations were 
promulgated under the UNCST Statute and a review of its provisions indicates that it 
does not provide for the promulgation of regulations.
 602
  As such, the UNCST statute 
does not support the regulations. The Draft Biosafety Regulations may therefore, 
arguably be invalid. 
 
7.16 Conclusion 
As noted above the regulatory framework in Uganda is still rather ad hoc in nature and is 
still under development. It appears nonetheless that efforts are being made to address 
pertinent biosafety issues in an adequate manner. The Draft Biosafety Regulations, 
notwithstanding its lack of legal authority, has some good points that are worth noting. 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations attempt to address crucial issues in biosafety regulation. 
Notable among these are liability and redress, the precautionary principle, public 
participation and labeling and identification. One of its strongest points is arguably the 
extension of liability to developers and suppliers of GMOs in addition to the users. This 
clearly goes ahead of the Biosafety Protocol, which does not contain liability and redress 
provisions. Weaknesses noted under the Regulations include the fact that, their scope of 
application is restricted to living products, and the fact that the risk assessment provisions 
are ambiguous and unclear. Another serious weakness with the Draft Regulations is that, 
they appear not to have any legal force as such its application is arguably not mandatory.  
 
The Biosafety Bill, which represents Uganda’s future biosafety law on the other hand, is 
largely adequate. The Biosafety Bill similarly addresses the crucial biosafety issues and it 
does this in a more adequate manner than the Draft Biosafety Regulations. Its strengths 
include a comprehensive liability and redress regime and clear labeling and identification 
provisions. Since Uganda has shown interest in enacting a legally binding piece of 
legislation for biosafety, it is submitted that the Draft Regulations should be disregarded 
and more efforts be directed towards passing the current Biosafety Bill into law. The 
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subsequent chapter therefore will attempt to suggest some ideas on how to improve the 





COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND UGANDA’S 
BIOSAFETY REGIMES 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to conduct a comparative analysis of the South African regulatory 
regime and Uganda’s future biosafety regulatory regime (the Biosafety Bill). The 
objective is to determine how the two countries deal with specified issues in their 
biosafety regulatory systems. Therefore, differences and similarities in the systems of the 
two countries will be highlighted. This chapter will also test to what extent the two 
countries have attempted to comply with international obligations with respect to 
biosafety especially the Biosafety Protocol and the African Model Law. Where shortfall 
and deficiencies are noted, this paper will attempt to point out how these shortfalls may 
be remedied. The assessment will be done under the following themes utilised in the 
foregoing critical analysis of the two domestic regimes, namely: institutions; decision-
making; public participation; risk assessment; liability and redress; labeling and 
identification; and Compliance and Enforcement. 
 
8.2 Institutional Arrangement 
The GMO Act establishes three institutions; these are the Executive Council, the 
Registrar and the Advisory Committee.
603
 The Ugandan Biosafety Bill
604
  provides for 
the establishment of three related institutions namely the NFP, the NCA and the NBCs. 
As far their duties are concerned, the Executive Council under the GMO Act and the 
concomitant, NCA under the Ugandan Bill, are charged with similar functions. The most 
significant function is decision-making concerning GMO related activities in their 
respective countries.
605
 While the GMO Act sets out the composition of the Executive 
Council,
606
 the Biosafety Bill specifically names the UNCST the NCA.
607
 It does not 
however stipulate the composition of this body. It is assumed that this body will most 
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likely be composed of scientists considering that it is the National Council for Science. 
The NBC plays an advisory role to the NCA.
608
 It is parallel to the Advisory Committee 
under the GMO Act, which advises the Minister, the Council, and plays the role of the 




A noteworthy difference in the systems of the two countries is in the composition of the 
Advisory bodies, that is the NBC (Uganda) and the Advisory Committee (South Africa). 
While the Biosafety Bill provides for the representation of the civil society, which is 
crucial in decision-making regarding GMO, the GMO Act does not. The GMO 
Amendment Bill does not redress the situation. Another difference worth mentioning is 
that the while the GMO Act establishes the office of the Registrar, the Ugandan system 
does not. 
 
A similarity is noted in the extent of discretion awarded to the decision-making bodies. 
The Executive Council has the discretion, for instance, to determine when an EIA should 
be supplied by an applicant.
610
 The trend appears to be the same in Uganda where the 





Whereas the Biosafety Protocol requires each party to designate a NFP and NCA,
612
 the 
African Model law, which provides for the establishment of the foregoing institutions, 
goes further. It also provides for the establishment of the NBC and the IBC.
613
 The 
institutional arrangements in the Ugandan system appear to be based on the African 
Model law and appear preferable to that based in South Africa as it provides for a multi 
disciplinary representation in decision-making.
614
 Both countries need to consider 
reducing the discretion afforded to their key decision-making bodies in the context of 
biosafety regulation. Biosafety requires very stringent regulation and affording decision-
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makers with too much discretion might render regulation defunct. Alternatively, there is 
need to ensure comprehensive representation of all relevant stakeholders on decision-
making bodies and comprehensive public participation procedures.  
 
8.3 Decision-making 
A number of issues are central to ensuring effective decision-making. These include: risk 
assessment; the precautionary principle; socio-economic considerations; and public 
input.
615
 While the Ugandan Biosafety Bill contains a decision-making procedure,
616
 The 
South African regime does not. The Ugandan provisions are unfortunately, rather vague 
and imprecise, as earlier noted. They do not expressly indicate what considerations 
should to be taken into account in decision-making.
617
 However, since the Biosafety Bill 
makes provision for the said considerations in separate sections as noted before, it would 
be safe to conclude that biosafety decisions should be ‘precautionary’ and ‘risk-based’ 
when the Bill takes effect. Regarding the South African system, it is safe to conclude 
from the circumstances that the above critical issues do not play any role in the decision-
making process. This view is plausible because the GMO Act, its Regulations and the 
Amendment Bill do not provide for mandatory risk assessment, public participation or 
the application of the precautionary principle as noted earlier.  
 
While the Ugandan system largely complies with the international law in this regard, the 
same is not true for South Africa. It is suggested that Uganda considers inserting a more 
precise provision in its Biosafety Bill, which clearly spells out the considerations to be 
taken into account in decision-making. Secondly, the Biosafety Bill should bind decision-
makers to observe detailed procedure on decision-making to be contained in the 
Guidelines.
618
 In the case of South Africa, a section on decision-making should be 
included in the GMO Amendment Bill in which all the important issues mentioned above 
are included. Although South Africa has, Guidelines (General) and (Advisory 
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Committee), for decision-makers, these so not include the important considerations under 
discussion. Due to their importance, these considerations should preferably be included in 
an Act, which has legal force as opposed to Guidelines, which may not be legally binding.  
 
8.4 Public participation 
The countries approaches to public participation are very different. While the Ugandan 
regime contains provisions on public participation that are largely adequate, the GMO 
Act does not contain any provisions on public participation. An adequate public 
participation regime should guarantee the right of citizens to information, the right to 
participate in decision-making and access to mechanisms of justice and redress when 
their rights are violated as noted previously. The Ugandan Biosafety Bill attempts to 
capture all these requirements and appears to be based on the African Model law, which 
is commendable. The South African situation, on the other hand, requires reform as 
public participation is a very important element in environmental decision-making. Much 
as access to information is guaranteed elsewhere in South Africa’s Constitutional and 
framework environmental law,
619
 its inclusion under the GMO legislation is imperative 
and makes its application much easier and accessible. Consequently, South Africa fails to 
comply with international law in this respect. South Africa should therefore consider 
making amendments to the GMO Act to include specific provisions on public 
participation.  
 
8.5 Risk Assessment  
In Uganda, no GMO or product of GMO activity may take place without assessment of 
risks except as otherwise provided for.
620
 This requirement appears to be discretionary. In 
instances where risk assessment is not conducted, it is not clear whether the authorities 
would be able to make informed decisions.
621
 The trend appears to be the same in the 
South African regime where risk assessment is provided for only in the GMO 
Regulations as previously noted. The insertion of such a requirement in the Regulations 
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arguably renders its application discretionary. Such a requirement should preferably have 
been placed in the GMO Act.  
 
Both Uganda and South Africa appear to be failing to meet their international obligation 
under the Biosafety Protocol in this respect. Uganda needs to redraft the provisions of its 
Bill relating to risk assessment and set the requirement as mandatory. It is proposed that 
South Africa adopts clear and precise provisions on risk assessment and these should be 
included in the GMO Act, through its amendment. The provisions in the African Model 
law are recommended as they provide for rigorous risk assessment. 
 
8.6 Liability and redress  
There are considerable differences in the way the biosafety regimes in Uganda and South 
Africa deal with liability and redress. While the Ugandan regime attempts to provide a 
comprehensive regime, the opposite is true for South Africa. As earlier noted, the crucial 
issues in a liability regime include: the type of loss that is remediable; the standard of 
care; time limits for bringing action; the person responsible for damage; and financial 
guarantees to compensate for damages. The Biosafety Bill, largely based on the Africa 
Model Law, attempts to cover all these issues, and appears to provide satisfactory regime.  
 
On the contrary, South African law does not provide a comprehensive liability regime for 
GMOs. It contains a regime, which is said to be unjust as it makes the end users liable for 
damage.
622
 The duty of care and emergency incidents provisions under South Africa’s 
NEMA appear to remedy the situation. However, these are not comprehensive enough 
and may not be easily accessible. It is suggested that more comprehensive regime is 
included in the GMO Amendment Bill, which should make among others the 
supplier/developer of GMOs liable in case of damage; set the standard of proof as strict 
liability; provide for a wide scope of damage that is remediable; and make provision for 
financial guarantees to compensate for damages. Suppliers and developers are clearly 
better placed to remedy any damage financially and in terms of technical expertise. A 
strict liability will motivate concerned parties to be more diligent when using GMOs.  
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Although the Cartagena Protocol does not set out a liability regime, the African Model 
Law does provide a comprehensive regime for liability and redress which African 
countries are encouraged to adopt in the absence of an adequate regime elsewhere under 
international law. South Africa should therefore seek guidance from the provisions of the 
African Model Law. 
 
8.7 Labelling and Identification 
The South African biosafety law does not provide for mandatory labeling of GMOs or 
GMO products. Conversely, in Uganda there is a requirement for clear labelling and 
identification in the proposed Bill. The Biosafety Protocol does not contain satisfactory 
provisions on labeling and identification as noted previously. Its provisions are rather 
ambiguous in this respect. The African Model Law however attempts to set out distinct 
requirements for labelling of GMOs on which the Ugandan Biosafety Bill relies. It is 
suggested that South Africa includes mandatory labelling provisions in its biosafety 
regulation through the amendment of the GMO Act. The provisions in the African Model 
Law are suggested as a template as they are clear and precise. 
 
8.8 Compliance and Enforcement  
In both countries, there is provision for enforcement of the biosafety regulations through 
offences and penalties as well as enforcement powers granted to inspectors. The 
Biosafety Bill of Uganda appears to have adopted the offence and penalty provisions 
under the African Model Law.  There is a wider range of acts that are illegal there under 
including using false and deceptive labels. On the contrary, the offences under the GMO 
Act are very limited.
623
 There is a need therefore to include more offences under the 
offence provision. For instance, importing, releasing or placing on the market of any 
GMO or product of GMO without written approval should be criminalized. This would 
restrain persons from engaging in such activities without authorization, as they would be 
liable to punishment as opposed to if these acts are not criminalized.  
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As far as the penalties are concerned, the Ugandan Biosafety Bill stipulates harsh 
penalties for persons convicted under the proposed Act. It prescribes imprisonment for 
not less than five years and not exceeding ten years.
624
 The GMO Act provides for very 
moderate sentences such as imprisonment not exceeding two years. South Africa must 
consider including more severe penalties such as imprisonment for not less than five 
years and a fine. This is important because GMO related activities might have dire 
consequences hence warranting strict regulation.  
 
The GMO Act and the Biosafety Bill both provide for inspectors who are charged with 
duties including investigating whether conditions of approval and provisions of the 
relevant laws are being implemented. In both systems, they are granted reasonable 
powers to enter premises with or without notice. They have powers to search, inspect and 
take samples. The Ugandan Bill however grants more powers that are relevant to the 
inspectors including the power to seize and the power to issue a directive. The power to 
seize and the power to issue directives are very important especially if the circumstances 
call for it. 
 
8.9 Conclusion 
There are a few noted similarities in the biosafety regulation in the two countries for 
instance regarding institutions and enforcement. Yet there are varied differences in their 
approach to more critical issues such as liability, public participation, labelling and risk 
assessment. From an overall perspective, Uganda’s future biosafety framework appears to 
provide a more comprehensive and effective framework for biosafety regulation.  
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This study sought to conduct a critical and comparative analysis of biosafety regulation in 
South Africa and Uganda. The key question that the paper addressed was: which 
country’s biosafety regime provides a more adequate regulatory framework? In the first 
instance, this paper considered international instruments relevant to biosafety regulation. 
These are the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the non-binding African Model Law. 
It was noted that the negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol were highly controversial 
such that the final text of the Protocol reflects a compromise. Consequently, the Biosafety 
Protocol establishes only minimum standards in relation to biosafety. However, the 
Protocol does not inhibit states from exercising their rights under the state sovereignty 
doctrine which enables states to ‘take action that is more protective’ of their 
environments and thereby make legislation that fits into their local circumstances.
625
  
Failure to provide a liability and redress regime is one of the outstanding weaknesses of 
the Protocol. However, plans are underway following the Kuala Lumpur COPs meeting 




It was also noted that the African Model Law contains comprehensive and arguably 
adequate provisions on biosafety regulation. The African Model Law makes use of the 
state sovereignty doctrine embraced by the Protocol to establish a more stringent 
biosafety regime. For instance, the African Model Law establishes a comprehensive and 
relevant liability and redress regime. However, its non-binding nature makes it 
imperative that member states must not only pledge but also implement it in their 
evolving biosafety legislation, if the Model Law is to serve any meaningful purpose. On 
this basis, this study found that South Africa’s attempt to comply with the African Model 
Law is far below any expectations compared to Uganda. 
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In the domestic sphere, assessment of the South African biosafety regime indicated that 
the system is grossly inadequate.  The GMO Act focuses on institutional arrangements 
and does not address core issues in biosafety. It lacks a liability and redress regime; 
contains discretionary requirements for risk assessment; makes inadequate provision for 
public participation and, does not provide for proper application of the precautionary 
principle. Although the GMO Amendment Bill seeks to make the GMO Act compliant 
with the Biosafety Protocol, it has invariably failed to improve the current regime. The 
said Bill is inadequate as it does not address key issues such as the liability and redress 
regime, the precautionary principle and public participation. As a consequence, the GMO 
Amendment Bill fails to cure the inherent weaknesses of the GMO Act thereby rendering 
the biosafety regime in South Africa neither relevant nor credible. 
 
In Uganda, it was noted that current regulation is rather ad hoc.  The Draft Biosafety 
Regulations and the Biosafety Bill were the key legislations reviewed. Concerning the 
Draft Biosafety Regulations, it was noted that these do not have any legal force.  The 
UNCST statute does not contain provisions enabling the promulgation of such 
Regulations.  Thus, application of these regulations is largely voluntary.  The Ugandan 
Bill appears promising yet it is still aspirational.  Some potential was noted in the Bill 
that is worth applauding.  It is largely founded on the African Model Law to the extent 
that it provides for stringent regulation in critical tenets of biosafety.  The controversial 
precautionary principle is adopted in the Bill as well as precise labeling and identification 
provisions.  The Bill also takes cognizance of socio-economic considerations and issues 
of public participation in biosafety. While the Ugandan regime addresses the above and 
other contentious issues, the same cannot be said for South Africa. About a decade since 
the enactment of GMO Act together with the recent GMO Amendment Bill, South 
African biosafety regulation remains largely inadequate.  
 
Differences and similarities were noted following the thematic comparative analysis of 
biosafety regulation in South Africa and Uganda. From an overall perspective, it was 
noted that, Uganda is more compliant with international law regulating biosafety than 




African Model Law. This position is admirable and it is hoped that other African 
countries developing Biosafety laws can follow Uganda’s example. Major variances were 
noted in the way South Africa and Uganda deal with issues such as, liability and redress, 
the precautionary principle and labeling and identification. Similarities were noted in 
their approach to institutional arrangements and enforcement. 
 
A key role that governments have to play is to protect the environment and its people 
from the potential harm caused by GMOs. It is imperative that, high standards of 
regulation of modern biotechnology are set since, the dangers associated with GMOs are 
not entirely known. Consequently, there is a likelihood of conflict as stringent regulation 
may impede GMO related activities in countries African countries that promote 
biotechnology. Inevitably, a compromise is needed in order to establish and maintain a 
balance of these competing interests. One way of achieving this compromise would be by 
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